How to Assess the Epistemic Wrongness of Sponsorship Bias? The Case of Manufactured Certainty.

Although the impact of so-called "sponsorship bias" has been the subject of increased attention in the philosophy of science, what exactly constitutes its wrongness is still debated. In this paper, I will argue that neither evidential accounts nor social-epistemological accounts can fully account for the epistemic wrongness of sponsorship bias, but there are good reasons to prefer social-epistemological to evidential accounts. I will defend this claim by examining how both accounts deal with a paradigm case from medical epistemology, recently discussed in a paper by Bennett Holman.

Neuroethics 1995-2012. A Bibliometric Analysis of the Guiding Themes of an Emerging Research Field.

In bioethics, the first decade of the twenty-first century was characterized by the emergence of interest in the ethical, legal, and social aspects of neuroscience research. At the same time an ongoing extension of the topics and phenomena addressed by neuroscientists was observed alongside its rise as one of the leading disciplines in the biomedical science. One of these phenomena addressed by neuroscientists and moral psychologists was the neural processes involved in moral decision-making.