Ownership and convention.

The basis of property rights is a central problem in political philosophy. The core philosophical dispute concerns whether property rights are natural facts, independent of human conventions. In this article, we examine adult judgments on this issue.

An anti-inertial motion bias explains people discounting inertial motion of carried objects.

In this paper we propose an anti-inertial motion (AIM) bias that can explain several intuitive physics beliefs including the straight-down belief and beliefs held concerning the pendulum problem. We show how the AIM bias also explains two new beliefs that we explore - a straight-up-and-down belief as well as a straight-out/backward bias that occurs for objects traveling in one plane that are then thrown in another plane, ostensibly affording a greater opportunity for perception of canonical motion. We then show how the AIM bias in general is invariant across perceived/imagined speed of the object carrier, only altering percentages of straight-out from backward responses, and why occluding the carrier once the object is released into a second plane does not result in more veridical perception.

Honor and Violence : An Account of Feuds, Duels, and Honor Killings.

We present a theory of honor violence as a form of costly signaling. Two types of honor violence are identified: revenge and purification. Both types are amenable to a signaling analysis whereby the violent behavior is a signal that can be used by out-groups to draw inferences about the nature of the signaling group, thereby helping to solve perennial problems of social cooperation: deterrence and assurance.

Green beards and signaling: Why morality is not indispensable.

We argue that although objectivist moral attitudes may facilitate cooperation, they are not necessary for the high levels of cooperation in humans. This is implied by evolutionary models that articulate a mechanism underlying Stanford's account, and is also suggested by the ability of merely conventional social norms to explain extreme human behaviors.

Peer punishment promotes enforcement of bad social norms.

Social norms are an important element in explaining how humans achieve very high levels of cooperative activity. It is widely observed that, when norms can be enforced by peer punishment, groups are able to resolve social dilemmas in prosocial, cooperative ways. Here we show that punishment can also encourage participation in destructive behaviours that are harmful to group welfare, and that this phenomenon is mediated by a social norm.