A Prescriptive Metaphysics of DEATH.

Much of the debate over whether brain death is death has focused on whether the loss of all brain functions entails the loss of the integration of the human organism as a whole. However, there has been growing recognition that the legal definition of death is not a matter that can be settled by such biological considerations alone and that metaphysical considerations about our nature, along with social and ethical considerations about how brain dead individuals should be treated, are relevant to the choice of criteria for determining death. In this paper, I show how some of the leading proponents and opponents of brain death acknowledge the relevance of metaphysical, social, and ethical considerations and how this may provide some common ground in working toward a consensus on brain death.

Defining Death: Toward a Biological and Ethical Synthesis.

Much of the debate over the definition and criteria for determining our death has focused on disagreement over the correct biological account of death, i.e., what it means for any organism to die.

Why DCD Donors Are Dead.

Critics of organ donation after circulatory death (DCD) argue that, even if donors are past the point of autoresuscitation, they have not satisfied the "irreversibility" requirement in the circulatory and respiratory criteria for determining death, since their circulation and respiration could be artificially restored. Thus, removing their vital organs violates the "dead-donor" rule. I defend DCD donation against this criticism.

Where's Waldo? The 'decapitation gambit' and the definition of death.

The 'decapitation gambit' holds that, if physical decapitation normally entails the death of the human being, then physiological decapitation, evident in cases of total brain failure, entails the death of the human being. This argument has been challenged by Franklin Miller and Robert Truog, who argue that physical decapitation does not necessarily entail the death of human beings and that therefore, by analogy, artificially sustained human bodies with total brain failure are living human beings. They thus challenge the current neurological criterion for determining death and argue for a return to the traditional criterion of the irreversible loss of circulation and respiration.

Commentary on "The incoherence of determining death by neurological criteria".

This commentary challenges the conclusions reached by Franklin Miller and Robert Truog in their criticism of the President's Council's White Paper, "Controversies in the Determination of Death." I agree with much of Miller and Truog's criticism of the rationale offered by the President's Council for accepting neurological criteria for determining death but argue that they too quickly dismiss the alternative rationale of determining death by neurological criteria-i.e.

Potentiality and human embryos.

Consideration of the potentiality of human embryos to develop characteristics of personhood, such as intellect and will, has figured prominently in arguments against abortion and the use of human embryos for research. In particular, such consideration was the basis for the call of the US President's Council on Bioethics for a moratorium on stem cell research on human embryos. In this paper, I critique the concept of potentiality invoked by the Council and offer an alternative account.

Potentiality, irreversibility, and death.

There has been growing concern about whether individuals who satisfy neurological criteria for death or who become non-heart-beating organ donors are really dead. This concern has focused on the issue of the potential for recovery that these individuals may still have and whether their conditions are irreversible. In this article I examine the concepts of potentiality and irreversibility that have been invoked in the discussions of the definition of death and non-heart-beating organ donation.