Uncertainties in atmospheric dispersion modelling during nuclear accidents.

Predictions of the atmospheric dispersion of radionuclides accidentally released from a nuclear power plant are influenced by two large sources of uncertainty: one associated with the meteorological data employed, and one with the source term, i.e. the temporal evolution of the amount and physical and chemical properties of the release.

Modelling Environmental Impacts of Cesium-137 Under a Hypothetical Release of Radioactive Waste.

Waste tanks at the nuclear facility located at Sellafield, UK, represent a nuclear source which could release radionuclides to the atmosphere. A model chain which combines atmospheric transport, deposition as well as riverine transport to sea has been developed to predict the riverine activity concentrations of Cs. The source term was estimated to be 9 × 10 TBq of Cs, or 1% of the assumed total Cs inventory of the HAL (Highly Active Liquid) storage tanks.

Contribution of Poland to Atmospheric Nitrogen Deposition to the Baltic Sea.

Poland is the second most important emission source after Germany in contributing atmospheric nitrogen deposition to the Baltic Sea basin. The main sectors contributing to reactive nitrogen emissions from Polish sources, in the period 1995-2014, are combustion and transportation, responsible together for over 97% of nitrogen oxide emissions, and agriculture responsible for over 98% of ammonia emissions. The EMEP MSC-W model with 50-km resolution was used for estimating the contribution of nitrogen emission sources from Poland to nitrogen deposition into the Baltic Sea basin and its sub-basins, in the period 1995-2014.

Atmospheric transport of radioactive debris to Norway in case of a hypothetical accident related to the recovery of the Russian submarine K-27.

The Russian nuclear submarine K-27 suffered a loss of coolant accident in 1968 and with nuclear fuel in both reactors it was scuttled in 1981 in the outer part of Stepovogo Bay located on the eastern coast of Novaya Zemlya. The inventory of spent nuclear fuel on board the submarine is of concern because it represents a potential source of radioactive contamination of the Kara Sea and a criticality accident with potential for long-range atmospheric transport of radioactive particles cannot be ruled out. To address these concerns and to provide a better basis for evaluating possible radiological impacts of potential releases in case a salvage operation is initiated, we assessed the atmospheric transport of radionuclides and deposition in Norway from a hypothetical criticality accident on board the K-27.

Long-range tropospheric transport of uranium and plutonium weapons fallout from Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to Norway.

A combination of state-of-the-art isotopic fingerprinting techniques and atmospheric transport modelling using real-time historical meteorological data has been used to demonstrate direct tropospheric transport of radioactive debris from specific nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan to Norway via large areas of Europe. A selection of archived air filters collected at ground level at 9 stations in Norway during the most intensive atmospheric nuclear weapon testing periods (1957-1958 and 1961-1962) has been screened for radioactive particles and analysed with respect to the concentrations and atom ratios of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Digital autoradiography screening demonstrated the presence of radioactive particles in the filters.