Comments on Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed's "A critical perspective on second-order empathy in understanding psychopathology: phenomenology and ethics".

Understanding the mental life of persons with psychosis/schizophrenia has been the crucial challenge of psychiatry since its origins, both for scientific models as well as for every therapeutic encounter between persons with and without psychosis/schizophrenia. Nonetheless, a preliminary understanding is always the first step of phenomenological as well as other qualitative research methods addressing persons with psychotic experiences in their life-world. In contrast to Rashed's assertions, in order to achieve such understanding, phenomenological psychopathologists need not necessarily adopt the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, which, however, is often required if performing phenomenological philosophy.

Is acting on delusions autonomous?

In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type. Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced self-determination when acting on delusions.

An existential understanding of psychotherapy and psychiatric practice.

In this paper Karl Jaspers' writings on psychotherapy and the psychiatric practice will be profoundly investigated and a meticulous reconstruction of the development of his understandings in the course of his oeuvre will be presented. This reconstruction allows for arguing that Jaspers displays a methodologically critical attitude towards medicine as a 'science of actions' and that he did refrain from developing an existential psychotherapy for methodological and existential reasons. Nonetheless and aside from Jaspers' abstention, some of his concepts from existential philosophy, like 'Grenzsituation' (border-situation, limit-situation) or 'Gehäuse' (shell, housings), can be extraordinarily fruitful in psychotherapy and in the psychiatric practice because it requires a change of attitude in order to bring these concepts into play.

The phenomenology of intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl: on the capacities and limits of empathy and communication in psychiatric praxis.

In this article, we present two accounts of intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl, respectively. We argue that both can be brought together for a more satisfying account of empathy and communication in the context of psychiatric praxis. But while we restrict ourselves for the most part to this praxis, we also indicate the larger agenda that drives Jaspers and Husserl, despite all disagreement.

Lived autonomy and chronic mental illness: a phenomenological approach.

In this paper, I develop a phenomenological description of lived autonomy and describe possible alterations of lived autonomy associated with chronic depression as they relate to specific psychopathological symptoms. I will distinguish between two types of lived autonomy, a pre-reflective type and a reflective type, which differ with respect to the explicitness of the action that is willed into existence; and I will relate these types to the classical distinction between freedom of intentional action and freedom of the will. I will then describe how a chronically depressed person habitually discloses her experiential workspace with an impaired scope of perceivable action-properties, and pre-reflectively values many of these perceived action-properties as demanding or devalues these properties as well as her own abilities and drive to perform the respective actions ('depressive habituality').

In recovery from schizophrenia: regaining social cover - a phenomenological investigation.

We offer here a framework for the understanding of being in recovery from schizophrenia as an interpersonal process. We draw upon in-depth phenomenological descriptions of the fundamental changes taking place in an individual's mental life when they are suffering from schizophrenia. There is a loss of commonsensical habituality and interpersonal capabilities, usually most prominently expressed as an impaired intersubjective resonance.

No departure to "Pandora"? Using critical phenomenology to differentiate "naive" from "reflective" experience in psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine (a comment on Schwartz and Wiggins, 2010).

The mind-body problem lies at the heart of the clinical practice of both psychiatry and psychosomatic medicine. In their recent publication, Schwartz and Wiggins address the question of how to understand life as central to the mind-body problem. Drawing on their own use of the phenomenological method, we propose that the mind-body problem is not resolved by a general, evocative appeal to an all encompassing life-concept, but rather falters precisely at the insurmountable difference between "natural" and a "reflective" experience built into phenomenological method itself.

Addiction and self-determination: a phenomenological approach.

In this article, I focus on possibly impaired self-determination in addiction. After some methodological reflections, I introduce a phenomenological description of the experience of being self-determined. I argue that being self-determined implies effectivity of agency regarding three different behavioural domains.

Paranoid atmospheres: psychiatric knowledge and delusional realities.

In this paper I investigate the topic of paranoid atmospheres. This subject is especially of interest with respect to persons who are deluded, and also, I will demonstrate, sheds light upon the psychiatrist's "gaze" and knowledge of delusions. In my argument I will follow a path initially outlined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969): modern psychiatric diagnosis of delusions is a diagnosis of form and not content.

Embodiment and psychopathology: a phenomenological perspective.

Purpose Of Review: To survey recent developments in phenomenological psychopathology.

Recent Findings: We present the concept of embodiment as a key paradigm of recent interdisciplinary approaches from the areas of philosophy, psychology, psychiatry and neuroscience. This requires a short overview on the phenomenological concept of embodiment; in particular, on the distinction of subject and object body.