Beyond Value in Moral Phenomenology: The Role of Epistemic and Control Experiences.

Many researchers in moral psychology approach the topic of moral judgment in terms of value-assessing outcomes of behaviors as either harmful or helpful, which makes the behaviors wrong or right, respectively. However, recent advances in motivation science suggest that other motives may be at work as well-namely truth (wanting to establish what is real) and control (wanting to manage what happens). In this review, we argue that the epistemic experiences of observers of (im)moral behaviors, and the perceived epistemic experiences of those observed, serve as a groundwork for understanding how truth and control motives are implicated in the moral judgment process.

Sense of Personal Control Intensifies Moral Judgments of Others' Actions.

Recent research in moral psychology has highlighted how the current internal states of observers can influence their moral judgments of others' actions. In this article, we argue that an important internal state that serves such a function is the sense of control one has over one's own actions. Across four studies, we show that an individual's current sense of control is positively associated with the intensity of moral judgments of the actions of .

Eager feelings and vigilant reasons: Regulatory focus differences in judging moral wrongs.

For over a decade, moral psychologists have been actively researching the processes underlying moral judgments that are made intuitively without reference to an action's concrete harms or injustice, such as the well-known case of nonprocreative, consensual incest. We suggest that the reason some judge such scenarios as wrong (using intuitive feelings) and others do not (using deliberative reasons) is due to an important motivational distinction. Consistent with this view, across 7 studies, we demonstrate that negative judgments of such moral scenarios are more intense when processed in the promotion focus compared to the prevention focus, and that this is due to differences in whether eager (intuitive feelings) versus vigilant (deliberative reasons) means are employed in judging these moral wrongs.

Distress from Motivational Dis-integration: When Fundamental Motives Are Too Weak or Too Strong.

Past research has shown that satisfying different kinds of fundamental motives contributes to well-being. More recently, advances in motivational theory have shown that z is also tied to the integration of different motives. In other words, well-being depends not only on maximizing effectiveness in satisfying specific motives, but also on ensuring that motives work together such that no individual motive is too weak or too strong.

Microinterventions targeting regulatory focus and regulatory fit selectively reduce dysphoric and anxious mood.

Depression and generalized anxiety, separately and as comorbid states, continue to represent a significant public health challenge. Current cognitive-behavioral treatments are clearly beneficial but there remains a need for continued development of complementary interventions. This manuscript presents two proof-of-concept studies, in analog samples, of "microinterventions" derived from regulatory focus and regulatory fit theories and targeting dysphoric and anxious symptoms.

Judging Political Hearts and Minds: How Political Dynamics Drive Social Judgments.

We investigated how judgments of political messengers depend upon what would benefit one's preferred candidate. In Study 1a, participants were asked to evaluate the warmth and competence of the writer of a pro- or anti-Obama political message for the 2012 presidential election (Obama/warm; Romney/competent). When judging the messages, warmth was emphasized by Democrats and competence by Republicans.

Truth, control, and value motivations: the "what," "how," and "why" of approach and avoidance.

The hedonic principle-the desire to approach pleasure and avoid pain-is frequently presumed to be the fundamental principle upon which motivation is built. In the past few decades, researchers have enriched our understanding of how approaching pleasure and avoiding pain differ from each other. However, more recent empirical and theoretical work delineating the principles of motivation in humans and non-human animals has shown that not only can approach/avoidance motivations themselves be further distinguished into promotion approach/avoidance and prevention approach/avoidance, but that approaching pleasure and avoiding pain requires the functioning of additional distinct motivations-the motivation to establish what is real (truth) and the motivation to manage what happens (control).

Locomotion concerns with moral usefulness: When liberals endorse binding moral foundations.

Moral Foundations Theory has provided a framework for understanding the endorsement of different moral beliefs. Our research investigated whether there are other reasons to endorse moral foundations in addition to epistemic concerns; specifically, the perceived social of moral foundations. In Study 1, we demonstrate that those showing stronger locomotion concerns for controlling movement tend toward a higher endorsement of binding foundations, and that this effect is stronger among political liberals who otherwise do not typically endorse these foundations.

Repeating the past: prevention focus motivates repetition, even for unethical decisions.

Prevention-focused individuals are motivated to maintain the status quo. Given this, we predicted that individuals with a strong prevention focus, either as a chronic predisposition or situationally induced, would treat their initial decision on how to behave on a first task as the status quo and would thus be motivated to repeat that decision on a subsequent task-even for decisions that were ethically questionable. Results from five studies supported this prediction in multiple ethical domains: whether or not to overstate performance (Studies 1, 2a, and 2b), whether or not to disclose disadvantageous facts (Study 3), and whether or not to pledge a donation (Study 4).

Morality and its relation to political ideology: the role of promotion and prevention concerns.

Our research investigated whether promotion concerns with advancement and prevention concerns with security related to moral beliefs and political ideology. Study 1 found that chronic prevention and promotion focus had opposite relations to binding foundation endorsement (as measured by the Moral Foundations Questionnaire), that is, positive for prevention and negative for promotion, and opposite relations to political ideology, that is, more conservative for prevention and more liberal for promotion, and the relation between focus and political ideology was partially mediated by binding foundation endorsement. Study 2 showed that promotion and prevention, even as situationally induced states, can contribute to differences in binding foundation endorsement, with prevention producing stronger endorsement (compared with a control) and promotion producing weaker endorsement.