Surprisingly good talk: Misunderstanding others creates a barrier to constructive confrontation.

Open communication is important for maintaining relationships when conflicts inevitably arise. Nevertheless, people may avoid constructive confrontation to the extent that they expect others to respond negatively. In experiments involving recalled (Experiment 1), imagined (Experiment 2), simulated (Experiment 3), and actual confrontations (Experiments 4a and 4b), we find that people's expectations are systematically miscalibrated such that they overestimate how negatively others respond to confrontation.

How unexpected events are processed in theory of mind regions: A conceptual replication.

Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions - an agent's prior mental states (e.g.

Too Reluctant to Reach Out: Receiving Social Support Is More Positive Than Expressers Expect.

Receiving social support is critical for well-being, but concerns about a recipient's reaction could make people reluctant to express such support. Our studies indicate that people's expectations about how their support will be received predict their likelihood of expressing it (Study 1, = 100 online adults), but these expectations are systematically miscalibrated. Participants who sent messages of support to others they knew (Study 2, = 120 students) or who expressed support to a new acquaintance in person (Study 3, = 50 adult pairs) consistently underestimated how positively their recipients would respond.

Asking 'why?' enhances theory of mind when evaluating harm but not purity violations.

Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed important differences in the cognitive processes underlying judgments of harm and purity violations. In particular, research has demonstrated that whether a violation was committed intentionally vs accidentally has a larger impact on moral judgments of harm violations (e.g.

Neural substrates for moral judgments of psychological versus physical harm.

While we may think about harm as primarily being about physical injury, harm can also take the form of negative psychological impact. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined the extent to which moral judgments of physical and psychological harms are processed similarly, focusing on brain regions implicated in mental state reasoning or theory of mind, a key cognitive process for moral judgment. First, univariate analyses reveal item-specific features that lead to greater recruitment of theory of mind regions for psychological harm versus physical harm.

The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions.

Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations.

Distinct neural patterns of social cognition for cooperation versus competition.

How do people consider other minds during cooperation versus competition? Some accounts predict that theory of mind (ToM) is recruited more for cooperation versus competition or competition versus cooperation, whereas other accounts predict similar recruitment across these two contexts. The present fMRI study examined activity in brain regions for ToM (bilateral temporoparietal junction, precuneus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) across cooperative and competitive interactions with the same individual within the same paradigm. Although univariate analyses revealed that ToM regions overall were recruited similarly across interaction contexts, multivariate pattern analyses revealed that these regions nevertheless encoded information separating cooperation from competition.

Theory of mind for processing unexpected events across contexts.

Theory of mind, or mental state reasoning, may be particularly useful for making sense of unexpected events. Here, we investigated unexpected behavior across both social and non-social contexts in order to characterize the precise role of theory of mind in processing unexpected events. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine how people respond to unexpected outcomes when initial expectations were based on (i) an object's prior behavior, (ii) an agent's prior behavior and (iii) an agent's mental states.

When minds matter for moral judgment: intent information is neurally encoded for harmful but not impure acts.

Recent behavioral evidence indicates a key role for intent in moral judgments of harmful acts (e.g. assault) but not impure acts (e.

Correction: Harming Ourselves and Defiling Others: What Determines a Moral Domain?

[This corrects the article on p. e74434 in vol. 8.

Harming ourselves and defiling others: what determines a moral domain?

Recent work has distinguished "harm" from "purity" violations, but how does an act get classified as belonging to a domain in the first place? We demonstrate the impact of not only the kind of action (e.g., harmful versus impure) but also its target (e.

Decoding moral judgments from neural representations of intentions.

Intentional harms are typically judged to be morally worse than accidental harms. Distinguishing between intentional harms and accidents depends on the capacity for mental state reasoning (i.e.

Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference.

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks.

Where in the brain is morality? Everywhere and maybe nowhere.

The neuroscience of morality has focused on how morality works and where it is in the brain. In tackling these questions, researchers have taken both domain-specific and domain-general approaches-searching for neural substrates and systems dedicated to moral cognition versus characterizing the contributions of domain-general processes. Where in the brain is morality? On one hand, morality is made up of complex cognitive processes, deployed across many domains and housed all over the brain.