Background: 6-mercaptopurine has been a standard component of long-term continuing treatment for childhood lymphoblastic leukaemia, whereas 6-thioguanine has been mainly used for intensification courses. Since preliminary data have shown that 6-thioguanine is more effective than 6-mercaptopurine, we compared the efficacy and toxicity of the two drugs for childhood lymphoblastic leukaemia.
Methods: Consecutive children with lymphoblastic leukaemia diagnosed in the UK and Ireland between April, 1997, and June, 2002, were randomly assigned either 6-thioguanine (750 patients) or 6-mercaptopurine (748 patients) during interim maintenance and continuing therapy.
Objective: Thiopurine metabolism was investigated in children with acute lymphoblastic leukemia treated in the United Kingdom Medical Research Council trial ALL97. This trial compared the efficacy and toxicity of thioguanine (INN, thioguanine) versus mercaptopurine.
Methods: Consecutive children were randomized to receive thioguanine or mercaptopurine during maintenance chemotherapy.
Against a background of ever increasing expenditure on blood safety, less attention has been paid to improving the safety of the transfusion chain within hospitals. Based on reports to the Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT scheme) between 1996 and 2003, the risk of an error occurring during transfusion of a blood component is estimated at 1:16 500, an ABO incompatible transfusion at 1:100 000 and the risk of death as a result of an 'incorrect blood component transfused' (IBCT) is around 1:1 500 000. There are opportunities for error at a number of critical points in the transfusion chain, starting with the decision to transfuse, prescription and request, patient sampling, pretransfusion testing and finally the collection of the component from the blood refrigerator and administration to the patient, consistently the commonest error in successive SHOT reports.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFThe National Patient Safety Agency aims to generate an open and fair culture in the NHS where errors and near misses are reported, studied and learnt from. Safety rests in the design of equipment, systems, procedures, buildings and corporate frameworks, together with awareness of the human factors behind slips, lapses, mistakes and violations and how to anticipate and control them. Cultural shift can only be achieved if staff are willing to report and learn from such events and from near misses.
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