Comments on Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed's "A critical perspective on second-order empathy in understanding psychopathology: phenomenology and ethics".

Understanding the mental life of persons with psychosis/schizophrenia has been the crucial challenge of psychiatry since its origins, both for scientific models as well as for every therapeutic encounter between persons with and without psychosis/schizophrenia. Nonetheless, a preliminary understanding is always the first step of phenomenological as well as other qualitative research methods addressing persons with psychotic experiences in their life-world. In contrast to Rashed's assertions, in order to achieve such understanding, phenomenological psychopathologists need not necessarily adopt the transcendental-phenomenological attitude, which, however, is often required if performing phenomenological philosophy.

[Deactualization and orthostrophy. Phenomenological psychopathology of receding delusions].

In this article we develop a phenomenological psychopathology of receding delusions in persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Drawing on Klaus Conrad's (1905-1961) descriptions of beginning schizophrenia and an in-depth single case study, we develop descriptions of the process of receding delusions as opposed to ongoing delusions in the manner of a double-orientation to reality. We distinguish two stages in this process of social recovery and term these stages deactualization and orthostrophy.

Is acting on delusions autonomous?

In this paper the question of autonomy in delusional disorders is investigated using a phenomenological approach. I refer to the distinction between freedom of intentional action, and freedom of the will, and develop phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy, taking into account the distinction between a pre-reflective and a reflective type. Drawing on a case report, I deliver finely-grained phenomenological descriptions of lived autonomy and experienced self-determination when acting on delusions.