Towards a common framework of grounded action cognition: Relating motor control, perception and cognition.

The relation between motor control and action cognition - including action-related thoughts and action-related perception - has been subject to controversial discussions in the last three decades. During these decades, cognitive neuroscience has been increasingly confronted with a huge variety of different accounts trying to understand and explain the relation between these systems, their interdependencies and the mediating mechanisms by establishing notions such as "internal models", "simulation" or "shared representation". These accounts, however, include a large array of partly overlapping, partly contradictory theories using similar terms for different mechanisms and different terms for similar mechanisms.

The experience of agency: an interplay between prediction and postdiction.

The experience of agency, i.e., the registration that I am the initiator of my actions, is a basic and constant underpinning of our interaction with the world.

Memory and content.

The paper argues that any theory of content has to adopt a "functionalistic core" to concord with the cognitive sciences. This functionalistic core requires that representations are defined as substitutes in functions that describe the flexible behavior to be explained by the representation. The content of a representation can thus only be determined if the representation is "in use", i.

Me or not me--an optimal integration of agency cues?

Recent work has demonstrated that the sense of agency is not only determined by efference-copy-based internal predictions and internal comparator mechanisms, but by a large variety of different internal and external cues. The study by Moore and colleagues [Moore, J. W.

I move, therefore I am: a new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership.

The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively.

Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency.

There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions.