External dosimetry in the aftermath of a radiological terrorist event.

This paper reviews external dosimetry in emergency preparedness planning for a potential terrorist release of radioactive material in a densely populated area. The radiation dose received by response workers and members of the public is needed to understand health risks. The existing framework for dosimetry of routinely occupationally exposed workers is not directly applicable to all emergency workers who would respond to a radiological terrorist event.

Establishing remediation levels in response to a radiological dispersal event (or "dirty bomb").

The detonation of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) could produce significant social and economic damage, the extent of which would depend largely on how quickly and effectively cleanup levels were established and on public acceptance of those levels. This paper shows that current radiological cleanup laws and regulations, models for converting dose or risk goals to cleanup concentrations, and existing site-specific criteria were not designed specifically for RDD cleanups but, absent changes, would apply by default. The goals and approaches of these legal and methodological structures often conflict; using them in response to terrorism could undermine public confidence, cause delays, and produce unnecessary costs or unacceptable cleanups.

A new tool for analysis of cleanup criteria decisions.

Radionuclides and other hazardous materials resulting from processes used in nuclear weapons production contaminate soil, groundwater, and buildings around the United States. Cleanup criteria for environmental contaminants are agreed on prior to remediation and underpin the scope and legacy of the cleanup process. Analysis of cleanup criteria can be relevant for future agreements and may also provide insight into a complex decision making process where science and policy issues converge.