How Category Selection Impacts Inference Reliability: Inheritance Inference From an Ecological Perspective.

This article presents results from a simulation-based study of inheritance inference, that is, inference from the typicality of a property among a "base" class to its typicality among a subclass of the class. The study aims to ascertain which kinds of inheritance inferences are reliable, with attention to the dependence of their reliability upon the type of environment in which inferences are made. For example, the study addresses whether inheritance inference is reliable in the case of "exceptional subclasses" (i.

The material theory of object-induction and the universal optimality of meta-induction: Two complementary accounts.

This paper brings together two accounts of induction that appear to be in opposition: John Norton's material account of induction (2003, 2010, manuscript) and Schurz' account of the universal optimality of meta-induction (2008, 2017, 2019). According to the material account of induction, all reliable rules of 'induction' are local and context-dependent. Here "induction" is understood in the sense of object-induction, i.

The Role of Reasoning and Pragmatics in the Modifier Effect.

The modifier effect refers to the fact that the perceived likelihood of a property in a noun category is diminished if the noun is modified. For example, "Pigs live on farms" is rated as more likely than "Dirty pigs live on farms." The modifier effect has been demonstrated in many studies, but the underlying cognitive mechanisms are still unclear.

Cognitive Success: A Consequentialist Account of Rationality in Cognition.

One of the most discussed issues in psychology-presently and in the past-is how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism.

Cognitive success: instrumental justifications of normative systems of reasoning.

In the first part of the paper (sec. 1-4), I argue that Elqayam and Evan's (2011) distinction between normative and instrumental conceptions of cognitive rationality corresponds to deontological vs. teleological accounts in meta-ethics.

Bayesian pseudo-confirmation, use-novelty, and genuine confirmation.

According to the comparative Bayesian concept of confirmation, rationalized versions of creationism come out as empirically confirmed. From a scientific viewpoint, however, they are pseudo-explanations because with their help all kinds of experiences are explainable in an ex-post fashion, by way of ad-hoc fitting of an empirically empty theoretical framework to the given evidence. An alternative concept of confirmation that attempts to capture this intuition is the use novelty (UN) criterion of confirmation.