Affect and Cognition: Three Principles.

Affect and its object are separable, so that the same affective reaction can have different effects. Relevant principles from the affect-as-information approach include: (1) The impact of affect depends on implicit attributions -- what it appears to be about. (2) Affect is always taken to be about whatever is currently mentally accessible.

The myth of pure perception.

Firestone & Scholl (F&S) assume that pure perception is unaffected by cognition. This assumption is untenable for definitional, anatomical, and empirical reasons. They discount research showing nonoptical influences on visual perception, pointing out possible methodological "pitfalls.

Psychological Construction in the OCC Model of Emotion.

This article presents six ideas about the construction of emotion: (a) Emotions are more readily distinguished by the situations they signify than by patterns of bodily responses; (b) emotions emerge from, rather than cause, emotional thoughts, feelings, and expressions; (c) the impact of emotions is constrained by the nature of the situations they represent; (d) in the OCC account (the model proposed by Ortony, Clore, and Collins in 1988), appraisals are psychological aspects of situations that distinguish one emotion from another, rather than triggers that elicit emotions; (e) analyses of the affective lexicon indicate that emotion words refer to ; (f) the modularity of emotion, long sought in biology and behavior, exists as mental schemas for interpreting human experience in story, song, drama, and conversation.

The affective control of thought: malleable, not fixed.

Despite decades of research demonstrating a dedicated link between positive and negative affect and specific cognitive processes, not all research is consistent with this view. We present a new overarching theoretical account as an alternative-one that can simultaneously account for prior findings, generate new predictions, and encompass a wide range of phenomena. According to our proposed affect-as-cognitive-feedback account, affective reactions confer value on accessible information processing strategies (e.

Does stress enhance or impair memory consolidation?

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that stress-induced arousal enhances long-term memory for experiences associated with arousing events. Contrary to expectations, in each experiment exposure to a stressor (arm immersion in ice water) interfered with, rather than enhanced, long-term memory for associated material. Despite varying the stimuli (words, pictures), their emotional value (positive, negative, neutral), the time between learning and stress inductions (0 to 1 minute), and opportunities for post-learning rehearsal, each experiment produced a significant reversal of the hypothesised effect.

The faintest speck of dirt: disgust enhances the detection of impurity.

Purity is commonly regarded as being physically embodied in the color white, with even trivial deviations from whiteness indicating a loss of purity. In three studies, we explored the implications of this "white = pure" association for disgust, an emotion that motivates the detection and avoidance of impurities that threaten purity and cleanliness. We hypothesized that disgust tunes perception to prioritize the light end of the light-dark spectrum, which results in a relative hypersensitivity to changes in lightness in this range.

Affective facilitation and inhibition of cultural influences on reasoning.

Research in South Korea and the United States examined how affective states facilitate or inhibit culturally dominant styles of reasoning. According to the affect-as-information hypothesis, affective cues of mood influence judgements by serving as embodied information about the value of accessible inclinations and cognitions. Extending this line of research to culture, we hypothesised that positive affect should promote (and negative affect should inhibit) culturally normative reasoning.

Emotion and perception: the role of affective information.

Visual perception and emotion are traditionally considered separate domains of study. In this article, however, we review research showing them to be less separable than usually assumed. In fact, emotions routinely affect how and what we see.

Sometimes happy people focus on the trees and sad people focus on the forest: context-dependent effects of mood in impression formation.

Research indicates that affect influences whether people focus on categorical or behavioral information during impression formation. One explanation is that affect confers its value on whatever cognitive inclinations are most accessible in a given situation. Three studies tested this malleable mood effects hypothesis, predicting that happy moods should maintain and unhappy moods should inhibit situationally dominant thinking styles.

Affect influences false memories at encoding: evidence from recognition data.

Memory is susceptible to illusions in the form of false memories. Prior research found, however, that sad moods reduce false memories. The current experiment had two goals: (1) to determine whether affect influences retrieval processes, and (2) to determine whether affect influences the strength and the persistence of false memories.

Psychology and the Rationality of Emotion.

Questions addressed by recent psychological research on emotion include questions about how thought shapes emotion and how emotion, in turn, shapes thought. Research on emotion and cognition paints a somewhat different picture than that seen in traditional discussions of passion and reason. This article reviews several aspects of this research, concentrating specifically on three views of rationality: Rationality as Process, Rationality as Product, and Rationality as Outcome.

Mood and global-local focus: priming a local focus reverses the link between mood and global-local processing.

Positive moods promote a focus on the forest (global focus) and negative moods, a focus on the trees (local focus). Is this well-established link fixed or variable? Does it reflect a direct influence of affect, as usually assumed, or is it frequently observed simply because a global perspective is often dominant? If affect serves as information about the value of currently accessible inclinations, and a global focus is generally the default perspective, then the global focus of positive affect and local focus of negative affect might be variable rather than fixed. Two experiments tested this hypothesis using different mood inductions, different tests of global-local focus, and different methods of inducing global and local perspectives.

Affective regulation of stereotype activation: it's the (accessible) thought that counts.

Prior research has found that positive affect, compared to negative affect, increases stereotype activation. In four experiments the authors explore whether the link between affect and stereotype activation depends on the relative accessibility of stereotype-relevant thoughts and response tendencies. As well as manipulating mood, the authors measured or manipulated the accessibility of egalitarian response tendencies (Experiments 1 and 2) and counterstereotypic thoughts (Experiments 2 through 4).

The color of sin: white and black are perceptual symbols of moral purity and pollution.

Three studies examined automatic associations between words with moral and immoral meanings and the colors black and white. The speed of color naming in a Stroop task was faster when words in black concerned immorality (e.g.

Contagion without contact: anticipatory mood matching in response to affiliative motivation.

We investigated whether the desire to have a smooth and pleasant interaction with an anticipated interaction partner caused participants' moods to become similar to their imminent partners' moods. We found evidence of anticipatory mood matching when participants were motivated to affiliate with a partner through goal priming (Experiments 1 and 2) and outcome dependency (Experiment 3). Prior research has demonstrated mood contagion arising from actual social interaction but these experiments establish contagion without contact, an outcome evident regardless of whether mood was assessed via self-report (Experiments 1 through 3) or information-processing style (Experiment 3).

AFFECTIVE GUIDANCE OF INTELLIGENT AGENTS: How Emotion Controls Cognition.

Emotions and moods color cognition. In this article, we outline how emotions affect judgments and cognitive performance of human agents. We argue that affective influences are due, not to the affective reactions themselves, but to the information they carry about value, a potentially useful finding for creators of artificial agents.

A Reply to Commentaries on "How the Object of Affect Guides Its Impact".

Commentaries focused on the emotional appraisal part of our article. Cunningham and Van Bavel argued for distinguishing core disgust from moral disgust, and we describe how the theory might accommodate their proposal. They also suggested that temporal and other comparisons could account for emotional variety.

How the Object of Affect Guides its Impact.

In this article, we examine how affect influences judgment and thought, but also how thought transforms affect. The general thesis is that the nature and impact of affective reactions depends largely on their objects. We view affect as a representation of value, and its consequences as dependent on its object or what it is about.

Affective Arousal as Information: How Affective Arousal Influences Judgments, Learning, and Memory.

The affect-as-information framework posits that affect is embodied information about value and importance. The valence dimension of affect provides evaluative information about stimulus objects, which plays a role in judgment and decisionmaking. Affect can also provide evaluative information about one's own cognitions and response inclinations, information that guides thinking and reasoning.

Disgust as embodied moral judgment.

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls.

The Affective Regulation of Social Interaction.

The recent publication of David Heise's Expressive Order (2007) provides an occasion for discussing some of the key ideas in Affect Control Theory. The theory proposes that a few dimensions of affective meaning provide a common basis for interrelating personal identities and social actions. It holds that during interpersonal interactions, social behavior is continually regulated to maintain an affective tone compatible with whatever social roles or identities define the situation.

On the interdependence of cognition and emotion.

Affect and cognition have long been treated as independent entities, but in the current review we suggest that affect and cognition are in fact highly interdependent. We open the article by discussing three classic views for the independence of affect. These are (i) the affective independence hypothesis, that emotion is processed independently from cognition, (ii) the affective primacy hypothesis, that evaluative processing precedes semantic processing, and (iii) the affective automaticity hypothesis, that affectively potent stimuli commandeer attention and evaluation is automatic.

Skating down a steeper slope: fear influences the perception of geographical slant.

Previous studies have shown that conscious awareness of hill slant is overestimated, but visually guided actions directed at hills are relatively accurate. Also, steep hills are consciously estimated to be steeper from the top than the bottom, possibly because they are dangerous to descend. In the present study, participants stood at the top of a hill either on a skateboard or a wooden box of the same height.