Objectives: Antibacterial drug discovery activities are essential for filling clinical pipelines with promising clinical candidates. Little information is available about the challenges and shortcomings of small companies and academic institutions in performing these important discovery tasks.
Methods: We performed a content analysis of 463 reviewer comments on 91 funding applications of antibacterial drug discovery projects submitted to two major global funders between 2016 and 2020 that had not proceeded further in the selection process.
We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development (R&D) to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward (MER) on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFBackground: Antibiotic innovation has dwindled to dangerously low levels in the past 30 years. Since resistance continues to evolve, this innovation deficit can have perilous consequences on patients. A number of new incentives have been suggested to stimulate greater antibacterial drug innovation.
View Article and Find Full Text PDFThis Article examines the potential stakeholder-related obstacles hindering the implementation of mechanisms to re-ignite the development of novel antibiotics. Proposed economic models and incentives to drive such development include: Public Funding of Research and Development ("R&D"), Tax Incentives, Milestone Prizes, End Payments, Intellectual Property ("IP") and Exclusivity Extensions, Pricing and Reimbursement Incentives, Product Development Partnerships ("PDPs"), and the Options Market for Antibiotics model. Drawing on personal experience and understanding of the antibiotic field, as well as stakeholder consultation and numerous expert meetings within the DRIVE-AB project and Uppsala Health Summit 2015, the Authors identify obstacles attributable to the following actors: Universities and Research Institutes, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises ("SMEs"), Large Pharmaceutical Companies, Marketing Approval Regulators, Payors, Healthcare Providers, National Healthcare Authorities, Patients, and Supranational Institutions.
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