Moral Status and the Architects of Principlism.

In this article, we discuss Beauchamp and Childress's treatment of the issue of moral status. In particular, we (1) introduce the five different perspectives on moral status that Beauchamp and Childress consider in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and explain their alternative to those perspectives, (2) raise some critical questions about their approach, and (3) offer a different way to think about one of the five theories of moral status (the theory based on human properties) that is more in line with what we believe some of its leading advocates affirm.

Potentials and burdens: a reply to Giubilini and Minerva.

This article responds to Giubilini and Minerva's article 'After birth abortion: why should the baby live?' published in the Journal of Medical Ethics. They argue for the permissibility of 'after-birth abortion', based on two conjoined considerations: (1) the fetus or newborn, though a 'potential person', is not an actual person, because it is not mature enough to appreciate its own interests, and (2) because we allow parents to terminate the life of a fetus when it is diagnosed with a deformity or fatal illness because of the burden it will place on the child, parent, family or society we should also allow parents to do the same to their newborn, since it is no more a person than the fetus. The author critiques this case by pointing out (a) the metaphysical ambiguity of potential personhood and (b) why the appeal to burdens is irrelevant or unnecessary.

Stress tolerance in plants via habitat-adapted symbiosis.

We demonstrate that native grass species from coastal and geothermal habitats require symbiotic fungal endophytes for salt and heat tolerance, respectively. Symbiotically conferred stress tolerance is a habitat-specific phenomenon with geothermal endophytes conferring heat but not salt tolerance, and coastal endophytes conferring salt but not heat tolerance. The same fungal species isolated from plants in habitats devoid of salt or heat stress did not confer these stress tolerances.

The explanatory power of the substance view of persons.

The purpose of this essay is to offer support for the substance view of persons, the philosophical anthropology defended by Patrick Lee in his essay. In order to accomplish this the author (1) presents a brief definition of the substance view; (2) argues that the substance view has more explanatory power in accounting for why we believe that human persons are intrinsically valuable even when they are not functioning as such (e.g.