Navigating the normativity of behaviour settings: an observational case study.

Traditionally, sensitivity to situational norms is understood as deriving from internal cognitive states that represent the rules for appropriate conduct. On an alternative view, norms are 'out there', in the practices and situations themselves, without being duplicated in the head. However, what does normativity look like when it is performed by people engaging with a concrete situation? A 'behaviour setting' offers a window onto these dynamics.

Is theory of mind a prerequisite for social interactions? A study in psychotic disorder.

Background: A dominant idea is that impaired capacities for theory of mind (ToM) are the reasons for impairments in social functioning in several conditions, including autism and schizophrenia. In this paper, we present empirical evidence that challenges this influential assumption.

Methods: We conducted three studies examining the association between ToM and social functioning in participants diagnosed with a non-affective psychotic disorder and healthy individuals.

Reincarnating the Identity Theory.

The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point out that the identity theory is not necessarily a mind/brain identity theory. In fact, we propose an updated form of identity theory, or embodied identity theory, in which the identities concern not experiences and brain phenomena, but experiences and organism-environment interactions.

Psychotic reactivity to daily life stress and the dopamine system: a study combining experience sampling and [18F]fallypride positron emission tomography.

Stressful life events increase the risk for psychosis, and the subjective experience of stress related to daily life activities drives moment-to-moment variation in psychotic intensity. Positron emission tomography (PET) studies suggest that dopaminergic (DAergic) activity mediates the behavioral response to an experimental stressor. However, it is not known how alterations in this DAergic stress response relate to the subjective experience of stress in real life situations assessed in momentary assessment studies.

Extensive enactivism: why keep it all in?

Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from representationalism toward pure, empirical functionalism fails to provide a substantive "mark of the cognitive" and is bereft of other adequate means for individuating cognitive activity.

Perception with compensatory devices: from sensory substitution to sensorimotor extension.

Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.

The sensory-discriminative and affective-motivational aspects of pain.

What is the difference between pain and standard exteroceptive perceptual processes, such as vision or audition? According to the most common view, pain constitutes the internal perception of bodily damage. Following on from this definition, pain is just like exteroceptive perception, with the only difference being that it is not oriented toward publicly available objects, but rather toward events that are taking place in/to one's own body. Many theorists, however, have stressed that pain should not be seen as a kind of perception, but rather that it should be seen as a kind of affection or motivation to act instead.

Skill, corporality and alerting capacity in an account of sensory consciousness.

We suggest that within a skill-based, sensorimotor approach to sensory consciousness, two measurable properties of perceivers' interaction with the environment, "corporality" and "alerting capacity", explain why sensory stimulation is experienced as having a "sensory feel", unlike thoughts or memories. We propose that the notions of "corporality" and "alerting capacity" make possible the construction of a "phenomenality plot", which charts in a principled way the degree to which conscious phenomena are experienced as having a sensory quality.