'Managing values' in health economics modelling: Philosophical and practical considerations.

Stakeholder involvement has been proposed as a key strategy for appropriately managing value-laden decisions or 'value judgments' in health economics modelling. Philosophers of science, however, conceive of stakeholder involvement in research in conflicting ways, and also propose alternative strategies for 'managing values' in science. Furthermore, all proposed strategies for managing values in science raise philosophical questions and practical challenges that are difficult to resolve.

Patient and Public Involvement in Health Economics Modelling Raises the Need for Normative Guidance.

Patient and public involvement in health economics research and health technology assessment has been increasing for some time; however, patient and public involvement in health economics modelling is a more recent development. One reason to advance this type of involvement is to help appropriately manage the social and ethical value judgements that are required throughout model development and interpretation. At the same time, patient and public involvement in health economics modelling raises numerous practical and philosophical issues that invite discussion and debate.

The Epistemic Risk in Representation.

Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely-related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of inductive risk that aligns with this distinction, not one between internal/external phases in science; iii) to conceptualize 'representational risk' as a unique epistemic risk, no less significant than inductive risk.

Purposes and duties in scientific modelling.

More people than ever are paying attention to philosophical questions about epidemiological models, including their susceptibility to the influence of social and ethical values, sufficiency to inform policy decisions under certain conditions, and even their fundamental nature. One important question pertains to the purposes of epidemiological models, for example, are COVID-19 models for 'prediction' or 'projection'? Are they adequate for making causal inferences? Is one of their goals, or virtues, to change individual responses to the pandemic? In this essay, we offer our perspective on these questions and place them in the context of other recent philosophical arguments about epidemiological models. We argue that clarifying the intended purpose of a model, and assessing its adequacy for that purpose, are moral-epistemic duties, responsibilities which pertain to knowledge but have moral significance nonetheless.

This Paper Attacks a Strawman but the Strawman Wins: A reply to van Basshuysen and White.

We reply to van Basshuysen and White's criticism of our paper. We argue that they have misconstrued what our original claims were. Nevertheless, we maintain that their arguments against the position they incorrectly attribute to us fail.

Value judgments in a COVID-19 vaccination model: A case study in the need for public involvement in health-oriented modelling.

Scientific modelling is a value-laden process: the decisions involved can seldom be made using 'scientific' criteria alone, but rather draw on social and ethical values. In this paper, we draw on a body of philosophical literature to analyze a COVID-19 vaccination model, presenting a case study of social and ethical value judgments in health-oriented modelling. This case study urges us to make value judgments in health-oriented models explicit and interpretable by non-experts and to invite public involvement in making them.

Severe weather event attribution: Why values won't go away.

We start by reviewing the complicated situation in methods of scientific attribution of climate change to extreme weather events. We emphasize the social values involved in using both so-called ″storyline″ and ordinary probabilistic or ″risk-based″ methods, noting that one important virtue claimed by the storyline approach is that it features a reduction in false negative results, which has much social and ethical merit, according to its advocates. This merit is critiqued by the probabilistic, risk-based, opponents, who claim the high ground; the usual probabilistic approach is claimed to be more objective and more ″scientific″, under the grounds that it reduces false positive error.

Accountability and values in radically collaborative research.

This paper discusses a crisis of accountability that arises when scientific collaborations are massively epistemically distributed. We argue that social models of epistemic collaboration, which are social analogs to what Patrick Suppes called a "model of the experiment," must play a role in creating accountability in these contexts. We also argue that these social models must accommodate the fact that the various agents in a collaborative project often have ineliminable, messy, and conflicting interests and values; any story about accountability in a massively distributed collaboration must therefore involve models of such interests and values and their methodological and epistemic effects.

Values and uncertainties in the predictions of global climate models.

Over the last several years, there has been an explosion of interest and attention devoted to the problem of Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) in climate science-that is, to giving quantitative estimates of the degree of uncertainty associated with the predictions of global and regional climate models. The technical challenges associated with this project are formidable, and so the statistical community has understandably devoted itself primarily to overcoming them. But even as these technical challenges are being met, a number of persistent conceptual difficulties remain.