Risk, time, and psychological distance: Does construal level theory capture the impact of delay on risk preference?

Do people change their preferences when they are offered the same risky lotteries at different times (now vs. the future)? Construal level theory (CLT) suggests that people do because our mental representation of events is moderated by how near or distant such events are in time. According to CLT, in the domain of risk preferences, psychological distance causes payoffs and probabilities to be differentially weighted or attended between present and future timepoints: Temporal distance increases the influence of payoffs and decreases the influence of probabilities.

Violations of transitive preference: A comparison of compensatory and noncompensatory accounts.

Violations of transitive preference can be accounted for by both the noncompensatory lexicographic semiorder heuristic and the compensatory additive difference model. However, the two have not been directly compared. Here, we fully develop a simplified additive difference (SAD) model, which includes a graphical analysis of precisely which parameter values are consistent with adherence to, or violation of, transitive preference, as specified by weak stochastic transitivity (WST) and triangle inequalities (TI).

Fenneman et al.'s (2022) review of formal impulsivity models: Implications for theory and measures of impulsivity.

In Fenneman et al.'s (2022) review of theories and integrated impulsivity model, the authors distinguish between information impulsivity (i.e.

A systematic investigation into the reliability of inter-temporal choice model parameters.

Decades of work have been dedicated to developing and testing models that characterize how people make inter-temporal choices. Although parameter estimates from these models are often interpreted as indices of latent components of the choice process, little work has been done to examine their reliability. This is problematic because estimation error can bias conclusions that are drawn from these parameter estimates.

Patterns of choice adaptation in dynamic risky environments.

An important aspect of making good decisions is the ability to adapt to changes in the values of available choice options, and research suggests that we are poor at changing behavior and adapting our choices successfully. The current paper contributes to clarifying the role of memory on learning and successful adaptation to changing decision environments. We test two aspects of changing decision environments: the direction of change and the type of feedback.

The Role of Personal Experience and Prior Beliefs in Shaping Climate Change Perceptions: A Narrative Review.

Global climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as heatwaves, droughts, and flooding. This is the primary way many individuals experience climate change, which has led researchers to investigate the influence of personal experience on climate change concern and action. However, existing evidence is still limited and in some cases contradictory.

An Attempt to Correct Erroneous Ideas Among Teacher Education Students: The Effectiveness of Refutation Texts.

There is sound evidence about the high prevalence of misconceptions about education among pre-service teachers. This trend continues after students complete the degree in education and once they are in the exercise of their profession. In fact, several studies show that these misconceptions are widespread among in-service teachers.

Choice rates are independent from perceived patterns (when patterns are not obvious): A reply to Plonsky and Teodorescu.

In Ashby, Konstantinidis, and Yechiam (2017) we argued that the variance in people's choices in decisions from experience stems from uncertainty about preferences. This was confirmed by high correlations between the variance in experiential choices and subsequent one-shot policy decisions: both showing considerable diversification. In the present paper we address a comment regarding our paper by Plonsky and Teodorescu (2020).

Simultaneous underweighting and overestimation of rare events: Unpacking a paradox.

We investigated previous findings suggesting a paradoxical inconsistency of people's beliefs and choices: When making decisions under uncertainty, people seem to both overestimate the probability of rare events in their judgments and underweight the probability of the same rare events in their choices. In our reexamination, we found that people's beliefs are consistent with their decisions, but they do not necessarily correspond with the environment. Both overestimation and underweighting of the rare event seemed to result from (most, but not all) participants' mistaken belief that they can infer and exploit sequential patterns in a static environment.

Putting bandits into context: How function learning supports decision making.

The authors introduce the contextual multi-armed bandit task as a framework to investigate learning and decision making in uncertain environments. In this novel paradigm, participants repeatedly choose between multiple options in order to maximize their rewards. The options are described by a number of contextual features which are predictive of the rewards through initially unknown functions.

Magnitude and incentives: revisiting the overweighting of extreme events in risky decisions from experience.

Recent experimental evidence in experience-based decision-making suggests that people are more risk seeking in the gains domain relative to the losses domain. This critical result is at odds with the standard reflection effect observed in description-based choice and explained by Prospect Theory. The so-called reversed-reflection effect has been predicated on the extreme-outcome rule, which suggests that memory biases affect risky choice from experience.

Task complexity moderates the influence of descriptions in decisions from experience.

Decisions-makers often have access to a combination of descriptive and experiential information, but limited research so far has explored decisions made using both. Three experiments explore the relationship between task complexity and the influence of descriptions. We show that in simple experience-based decision-making tasks, providing congruent descriptions has little influence on task performance in comparison to experience alone without descriptions, since learning via experience is relatively easy.

Choice in experiential learning: True preferences or experimental artifacts?

The rate of selecting different options in the decisions-from-feedback paradigm is commonly used to measure preferences resulting from experiential learning. While convergence to a single option increases with experience, some variance in choice remains even when options are static and offer fixed rewards. Employing a decisions-from-feedback paradigm followed by a policy-setting task, we examined whether the observed variance in choice is driven by factors related to the paradigm itself: Continued exploration (e.

Underpowered samples, false negatives, and unconscious learning.

The scientific community has witnessed growing concern about the high rate of false positives and unreliable results within the psychological literature, but the harmful impact of false negatives has been largely ignored. False negatives are particularly concerning in research areas where demonstrating the absence of an effect is crucial, such as studies of unconscious or implicit processing. Research on implicit processes seeks evidence of above-chance performance on some implicit behavioral measure at the same time as chance-level performance (that is, a null result) on an explicit measure of awareness.

Uncertainty and exploration in a restless bandit problem.

Decision making in noisy and changing environments requires a fine balance between exploiting knowledge about good courses of action and exploring the environment in order to improve upon this knowledge. We present an experiment on a restless bandit task in which participants made repeated choices between options for which the average rewards changed over time. Comparing a number of computational models of participants' behavior in this task, we find evidence that a substantial number of them balanced exploration and exploitation by considering the probability that an option offers the maximum reward out of all the available options.

Don't bet on it! Wagering as a measure of awareness in decision making under uncertainty.

Can our decisions be guided by unconscious or implicit influences? According to the somatic marker hypothesis, emotion-based signals can guide our decisions in uncertain environments outside awareness. Postdecision wagering, in which participants make wagers on the outcomes of their decisions, has been recently proposed as an objective and sensitive measure of conscious content. In 5 experiments we employed variations of a classic decision-making assessment, the Iowa Gambling Task, in combination with wagering in order to investigate the role played by unconscious influences.