Effects of Heterogeneity on Cancer: A Game Theory Perspective.

In this study, we explore interactions between cancer cells by using the hawk-dove game. We analyze the heterogeneity of tumors by considering games with populations composed of 2 or 3 types of cell. We determine what strategies are evolutionarily stable in the 2-type and 3-type population games and what the corresponding expected payoffs are.

Metastasis, an Example of Evolvability.

This overview focuses on two different perspectives to analyze the metastatic process taking clear cell renal cell carcinoma as a model, molecular and ecological. On the one hand, genomic analyses have demonstrated up to seven different constrained routes of tumor evolution and two different metastatic patterns. On the other hand, game theory applied to cell encounters within a tumor provides a sociological perspective of the possible behaviors of individuals (cells) in a collectivity.

Artificial distinction and real discrimination.

In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies.