Quantifying firm-level greenwashing: A systematic literature review.

In this systematic methodological literature review, we provide an overview, a typology, and a critical analysis of firm-level greenwashing measures derived from secondary data and utilized in empirical studies. 111 eligible studies were incorporated in this review. The high number of recently published studies in the field signals that in addition to conceptualizing greenwashing, lately there has been significant advancement in its operationalization.

Interpersonal lending network dataset of a Hungarian village in a disadvantaged region based on a quantitative survey.

The dataset presented in this paper consists of a network of interpersonal lending relations from a single village of a deprivated area of Hungary. The data are originated from quantitative surveys from May 2014 to June 2014. The data collection was embedded in a Participatory Action Research (PAR) which aimed to investigate the financial survival strategies of low-income households in a Hungarian village in a disadvantaged region.

Loan forbearance takeup in the Covid-era - The role of time preferences and locus of control.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries eased the burden on borrowers through loan forbearance. Using a representative sample of the Hungarian adult population, we investigate whether time preferences and locus of control are associated with loan forbearance takeup. We find evidence that time discounting correlates with the resort to forbearance: ceteris paribus, more patient individuals are less likely to take up forbearance, even after controlling for their present/future bias, risk aversion, locus of control, demographic characteristics, educational level, financial status, and the effects of the pandemic.

Adjustable-rate mortgages in the era of global reflation: How to model additional default risk?

We investigate the problem of interest rate risk transforming into default risk of adjustable-rate mortgage loans in the EU. Bank regulation is strikingly not neutral in this aspect, it explicitly favors short-duration adjustable-rate loans over long-duration fixed-rate loans in the framework of the gap management. This asymmetry in the regulation creates perverse incentives both for banks and households, which can lead to aggressive risk-taking, over-indebtedness of unhedged households, high procyclicality of mortgage markets, and increased systemic risks.