Item repetition and response deadline affect familiarity and recollection differently across childhood.

The aim was to examine how item repetition at encoding and response deadline at retrieval affect familiarity and recollection in 5-, 7-, or 11-year-old children ( = 156). Familiarity and recollection were estimated using a process dissociation paradigm. Direct comparison of the effects of repetition under unlimited and limited response time revealed a dissociation of familiarity and recollection.

Nothing compares: Unraveling learning task effects in judgment and categorization.

In judgment and categorization, the task is to infer the criterion value of an object based on cues. The cognitive mechanisms underlying such inferences are often distinguished in terms of whether they rely on an abstracted cue-criterion rule or on retrieving exemplars. The use of cue-based and exemplar-based strategies (and the associated generalization ability) has been shown to be influenced by how people had previously learned about the structure of the environment: learning by comparing two objects on the criterion promotes the subsequent adoption of a cue-based strategy (and generalization ability), directly learning the continuous criterion for each individual object promotes the use of an exemplar-based strategy.

Children conform, adults resist: A robot group induced peer pressure on normative social conformity.

People are known to change their behavior and decisions to conform to others, even for obviously incorrect facts. Because of recent developments in artificial intelligence and robotics, robots are increasingly found in human environments, and there, they form a novel social presence. It is as yet unclear whether and to what extent these social robots are able to exert pressure similar to human peers.

Do smart people have better intuitions?

There is much evidence that high-capacity reasoners perform better on a variety of reasoning tasks (Stanovich, 1999), a phenomenon that is normally attributed to differences in either the efficacy or the probability of deliberate (Type II) engagement (Evans, 2007). In contrast, we hypothesized that intuitive (Type I) processes may differentiate high- and low-capacity reasoners. To test this hypothesis, reasoners were given a reasoning task modeled on the logic of the Stroop Task, in which they had to ignore one dimension of a problem when instructed to give an answer based on the other dimension (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011).

Characterizing belief bias in syllogistic reasoning: A hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis of ROC data.

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831-863, 2010).

When fast logic meets slow belief: Evidence for a parallel-processing model of belief bias.

Two experiments pitted the default-interventionist account of belief bias against a parallel-processing model. According to the former, belief bias occurs because a fast, belief-based evaluation of the conclusion pre-empts a working-memory demanding logical analysis. In contrast, according to the latter both belief-based and logic-based responding occur in parallel.

Logic brightens my day: Evidence for implicit sensitivity to logical validity.

A key assumption of dual process theory is that reasoning is an explicit, effortful, deliberative process. The present study offers evidence for an implicit, possibly intuitive component of reasoning. Participants were shown sentences embedded in logically valid or invalid arguments.

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias.

Fluency and belief bias in deductive reasoning: new indices for old effects.

Models based on signal detection theory (SDT) have occupied a prominent role in domains such as perception, categorization, and memory. Recent work by Dube et al. (2010) suggests that the framework may also offer important insights in the domain of deductive reasoning.

Base rates: both neglected and intuitive.

Base-rate neglect refers to the tendency for people to underweight base-rate probabilities in favor of diagnostic information. It is commonly held that base-rate neglect occurs because effortful (Type 2) reasoning is required to process base-rate information, whereas diagnostic information is accessible to fast, intuitive (Type 1) processing (e.g.

The SDT model of belief bias: complexity, time, and cognitive ability mediate the effects of believability.

When people evaluate conclusions, they are often influenced by prior beliefs. Prevalent theories claim that belief bias affects the quality of syllogistic reasoning. However, recent work by Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) has suggested that belief bias may be a simple response bias.

Logic, beliefs, and instruction: a test of the default interventionist account of belief bias.

According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically.