Simulation requires activation of self-knowledge to change self-concept.

Simulating other people can shift one's self-concept, an effect known as simulation-induced malleability. How does imagining others shift the self? We propose that the activation of self-knowledge is the key factor by which simulation of others alters one's self-concept. We test this possibility across four studies that each manipulate self-knowledge activation indirectly during simulation and measure the impact on subsequent self-ratings.

The Emergence of Organized Emotion Dynamics in Childhood.

Unlabelled: Emotions change from one moment to the next. They have a from seconds to hours and then to other emotions. Here, we describe the early ontology of these key aspects of emotion dynamics.

Hyperscanning shows friends explore and strangers converge in conversation.

During conversation, people often endeavor to convey information in an understandable way (finding common ground) while also sharing novel or surprising information (exploring new ground). Here, we test how friends and strangers balance these two strategies to connect with each other. Using fMRI hyperscanning, we measure a preference for common ground as convergence over time and exploring new ground as divergence over time by tracking dyads' neural and linguistic trajectories over the course of semi-structured intimacy-building conversations.

Disentangling the effects of similarity, familiarity, and liking on social inference strategies.

People constantly make inferences about others' beliefs and preferences. People can draw on various sources of information to make these inferences, including stereotypes, self-knowledge, and target-specific knowledge. What leads people to use each of these sources of information over others? The current study examined factors that influence the use of these sources of information, focusing on three interpersonal dimensions - the extent to which people feel (a) familiar with, (b) similar to, or (c) like the target.

Why do we think? The dynamics of spontaneous thought reveal its functions.

Spontaneous thought-mind wandering, daydreaming, and creative ideation-makes up most of everyday cognition. Is this idle thought, or does it serve an adaptive function? We test two hypotheses about the functions of spontaneous thought: First, spontaneous thought improves memory efficiency. Under this hypothesis, spontaneous thought should prioritize detailed, vivid episodic simulations.

Individual differences in emotion prediction and implications for social success.

The social world requires people to predict others' thoughts, feelings, and actions. People who successfully predict others' emotions experience significant social advantages. What makes a person good at predicting emotions? To predict others' future emotional states, a person must know how one emotion transitions to the next.

Neural representations of situations and mental states are composed of sums of representations of the actions they afford.

Human behavior depends on both internal and external factors. Internally, people's mental states motivate and govern their behavior. Externally, one's situation constrains which actions are appropriate or possible.

Creativity at rest: Exploring functional network connectivity of creative experts.

The neuroscience of creativity seeks to disentangle the complex brain processes that underpin the generation of novel ideas. Neuroimaging studies of functional connectivity, particularly functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), have revealed individual differences in brain network organization associated with creative ability; however, much of the extant research is limited to laboratory-based divergent thinking measures. To overcome these limitations, we compare functional brain connectivity in a cohort of creative experts ( = 27) and controls ( = 26) and examine links with creative behavior.

Egocentric Projection is a Rational Strategy for Accurate Emotion Prediction.

People need to accurately understand and predict others' emotions in order to build and maintain meaningful social connections. However, when they encounter new social partners, people often do not have enough information about them to make accurate inferences. Rather, they often resort to an egocentric heuristic, and make predictions about a target by using their own self-knowledge as a proxy.

Simulation does not just inform choice, it changes choice.

Simulation - imagining future events - plays a role in decision-making. In Conviction Narrative Theory, people's emotional responses to their simulations inform their choices. Yet imagining one possible future also increases its plausibility and accessibility relative to other futures.

Transition dynamics shape mental state concepts.

People have a unique ability to represent other people's internal thoughts and feelings-their mental states. Mental state knowledge has a rich conceptual structure, organized along key dimensions, such as valence. People use this conceptual structure to guide social interactions.

Caregiver speech predicts the emergence of children's emotion vocabulary.

Learning about emotions is an important part of children's social and communicative development. How does children's emotion-related vocabulary emerge over development? How may emotion-related information in caregiver input support learning of emotion labels and other emotion-related words? This investigation examined language production and input among English-speaking toddlers (16-30 months) using two datasets: Wordbank (N = 5520; 36% female, 38% male, and 26% unknown gender; 1% Asian, 4% Black, 2% Hispanic, 40% White, 2% others, and 50% unknown ethnicity; collected in North America; dates of data collection unknown) and Child Language Data Exchange System (N = 587; 46% female, 44% male, 9% unknown gender, all unknown ethnicity; collected in North America and the UK; data collection dates, were available between 1962 and 2009). First, we show that toddlers develop the vocabulary to express increasingly wide ranges of emotional information during the first 2 years of life.

The promises and pitfalls of functional magnetic resonance imaging hyperscanning for social interaction research.

Social neuroscience combines tools and perspectives from social psychology and neuroscience to understand how people interact with their social world. Here we discuss a relatively new method-hyperscanning-to study real-time, interactive social interactions using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We highlight three contributions that fMRI hyperscanning makes to the study of the social mind: (1) Naturalism: it shifts the focus from tightly-controlled stimuli to more naturalistic social interactions; (2) Multi-person Dynamics: it shifts the focus from individuals as the unit of analysis to dyads and groups; and (3) Neural Resolution: fMRI hyperscanning captures high-resolution neural patterns and dynamics across the whole brain, unlike other neuroimaging hyperscanning methods (e.

The 3d Mind Model characterizes how people understand mental states across modern and historical cultures.

Humans rely on social interaction to achieve many important goals. These interactions rely in turn on people's capacity to understand others' mental states: their thoughts and feelings. Do different cultures understand minds in different ways, or do widely shared principles describe how different cultures understand mental states? Extensive data suggest that the mind organizes mental state concepts using the 3d Mind Model, composed of the psychological dimensions: rationality (vs.

Mask exposure during COVID-19 changes emotional face processing.

Faces are one of the key ways that we obtain social information about others. They allow people to identify individuals, understand conversational cues, and make judgements about others' mental states. When the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States, widespread mask-wearing practices were implemented, causing a shift in the way Americans typically interact.

Six dimensions describe action understanding: The ACT-FASTaxonomy.

Humans engage in a wide variety of different actions and activities. These range from simple motor actions like reaching for an object, to complex activities like governing a nation. Navigating everyday life requires people to make sense of this diversity of actions.

Clarifying the link between music and social bonding by measuring prosociality in context.

To corroborate the music and social bonding hypothesis, we propose that future investigations isolate specific components of social bonding and consider the influence of context. We deconstruct and operationalize social bonding through the lens of social psychology and provide examples of specific measures that can be used to assess how the link between music and sociality varies by context.

The people around you are inside your head: Social context shapes spontaneous thought.

Humans are highly social. We spend most of our time interacting with the social world, and we spend most of our thoughts thinking about the social world. Are we social beings by default, or is our sociality a response to the social world? On the one hand, fundamental social needs may drive social behavior.

The representational structure of mental states generalizes across target people and stimulus modalities.

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers can accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person's anger? Is reading about someone's anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other.

People accurately predict the transition probabilities between actions.

Social life is a complex dance. To coordinate gracefully with one's partners, one must predict their actions. Here, we investigated how people predict others' actions.

Perceiving actions before they happen: psychological dimensions scaffold neural action prediction.

The social world buzzes with action. People constantly walk, talk, eat, work, play, snooze and so on. To interact with others successfully, we need to both understand their current actions and predict their future actions.

Accurate emotion prediction in dyads and groups and its potential social benefits.

Emotion dynamics vary considerably from individual to individual and from group to group. Successful social interactions require people to track this moving target in order to anticipate the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. In two studies, we test whether people track others' emotional idiosyncrasies to make accurate, target-specific emotion predictions.

Successful simulation requires bridging levels of abstraction.

Although many simulations draw upon only one level of abstraction, the process for generating rich simulations requires a dynamic interplay between abstract and concrete knowledge. A complete model of simulation must account for a mind and brain that can bridge the perceptual with the conceptual, the episodic with the semantic, and the concrete with the abstract.

People represent mental states in terms of rationality, social impact, and valence: Validating the 3d Mind Model.

Humans can experience a wide variety of different thoughts and feelings in the course of everyday life. To successfully navigate the social world, people need to perceive, understand, and predict others' mental states. Previous research suggests that people use three dimensions to represent mental states: rationality, social impact, and valence.

Spontaneous Thought as an Unconstrained Memory Process.

The stream of thought can flow freely, without much guidance from attention or cognitive control. What determines what we think about from one moment to the next? Spontaneous thought shares many commonalities with memory processes. We use insights from computational models of memory to explain how the stream of thought flows through the landscape of memory.