Grievance-fueled violence can be better understood using an enactive approach.

Understanding lone actor grievance-fueled violence remains a challenge. We believe that the concept of grievance provides an opportunity to add an engaged, first-person perspective to the assessment of lone actor extreme violence. We propose an enactivist philosophical approach that can help to understand the why and how of the pathway from grievance to violent extremism.

Intentional content in psychopathologies requires an expanded interpretivism.

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how. Incorporating this practical approach to intentional state ascription in psychopathological cases expands and improves traditional interpretivism.

Self-Knowledge in Personality Disorder: Self-Referentiality as a Stepping Stone for Psychotherapeutic Understanding.

This article provides a philosophical framework to help unpack varieties of self-knowledge in clinical practice. We start from a hermeneutical conception of "the self," according to which the self is not interpreted as some fixed entity, but as embedded in and emerging from our relating to and interacting with our own conditions and activities, others, and the world. The notion of "self-referentiality" is introduced to further unpack how this self-relational activity can become manifest in one's emotions, speech acts, gestures, and actions.

Direct social perception, mindreading and Bayesian predictive coding.

Mindreading accounts of social cognition typically claim that we cannot directly perceive the mental states of other agents and therefore have to exercise certain cognitive capacities in order to infer them. In recent years this view has been challenged by proponents of the direct social perception (DSP) thesis, who argue that the mental states of other agents can be directly perceived. In this paper we show, first, that the main disagreement between proponents of DSP and mindreading accounts has to do with the so-called 'sandwich model' of social cognition.

Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading.

According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called 'implicit' false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model.