Specific autobiographical memories are a resource for identity strength among mature but not emerging adults.

Four studies, three pre-planned on Open Science Framework, with 2296 participants explored the potential role of recollecting autobiographical memories in enhancing the sense of identity. Among emerging adults (college students under age 25), recollecting important autobiographical memories did not strengthen sense of identity. Autobiographical memories failed to strengthen identity among emerging adults despite inducing low self-clarity first; despite attempts to prime self-consistent memories by having emerging adults report their stable self-aspects first; and despite attempts to inspire self-event connections by asking emerging adults to explain how the memories exemplified something enduring about the self.

Sharing specific "We" autobiographical memories in close relationships: the role of contact frequency.

Sharing memories in conversations with close others is posited to be part of the social function of autobiographical memory. The present research focused on the sharing of a particular type of memory: Specific memories about one-time co-experienced events, which we termed Specific We memories. Two studies with 595 total participants examined the factors that lead to and/or are influenced by the sharing of Specific We memories.

The effect of the order in which episodic autobiographical memories versus autobiographical knowledge are shared on feelings of closeness.

Autobiographical memories (AMs) can be used to create and maintain closeness with others [Alea, N., & Bluck, S. (2003).

Is sharing specific autobiographical memories a distinct form of self-disclosure?

Theories of autobiographical memory posit a social function, meaning that recollecting and sharing memories of specific discrete events creates and maintains relationship intimacy. Eight studies with 1,271 participants tested whether sharing specific autobiographical memories in conversations increases feelings of closeness among conversation partners, relative to sharing other self-related information. The first 2 studies revealed that conversations in which specific autobiographical memories were shared were also accompanied by feelings of closeness among conversation partners.

Incentives increase the rate of false but not true secondary confessions from informants with an allegiance to a suspect.

One hundred ninety-two students participated in an experimental simulation testing whether incentives would reduce the reluctance of informants to implicate a close other. Half of the students were made to feel interpersonally close to a confederate who either admitted to or denied a misdeed. All students were interrogated and encouraged to sign a secondary confession stating that the confederate had confessed to the misdeed; half were offered an incentive to do so.

Closure of autobiographical memories moderates their directive effect on behaviour.

Specific autobiographical memories have been theorised to serve a directive function, whereby the content of the memory directs behaviour outside awareness. The present research tested whether the extent to which a memory feels low in closure, or psychologically not in the past, moderates this directive effect. A total of 163 participants in an online experiment were asked to recollect a specific autobiographical memory of a time they had failed to donate to charity, or were not asked to recollect a memory.

Snitching, lies and computer crashes: an experimental investigation of secondary confessions.

Two laboratory studies with 332 student participants investigated secondary confessions (provided by an informant instead of the suspect). Participants allegedly caused or witnessed a simulated computer crash, then were asked to give primary or secondary confessions during interrogation. Study 1 replicated the false evidence effect for primary confessions.

What we regret most are lost opportunities: a theory of regret intensity.

A recent theory (Roese & Summerville, 2005) has suggested that regret is intensified by perceptions of future opportunity. In this work, however, it is proposed that feelings of regret are more likely elicited by perceptions of lost opportunity: People regret outcomes that could have been changed in the past but can no longer be changed and for which people experience low psychological closure. Consistent with the lost opportunity principle, Study 1 revealed that regretted experiences in the most commonly regretted life domains are perceived as offering the least opportunity for improvement in the future, Study 2 indicated that people experience the most regret for outcomes that are not repeatable, and Study 3 revealed that perceptions of higher past than future opportunities and low psychological closure predict regret intensity.

Incomplete inhibition of emotion in specific autobiographical memories.

Emotional inhibition in recollection of specific autobiographical memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000) is investigated in two experiments. Less complete emotional inhibition was hypothesised to correspond to a reduced sense of psychological closure. Emotional inhibition was identified by comparing the effect of emotion words relative to lifetime period words as primes.

Psychological closure as a memory phenomenon.

A theory is proposed that life events are remembered with a satisfying sense of closure when there is decreased emotional detail in the constructed autobiographical memory representation. The first three studies show that, although properties of the experienced event (such as valence and recency) accounted for some variance in participants' sense of closure, the amount of emotional detail in the memory was also a significant predictor. The third study shows that emotion-focused biased retelling of the experience increased emotional detail and decreased the sense of closure participants reported.

"Blaming the victim" under memory load.

When presented with negative outcomes, people often engage in counterfactual thinking imagining various ways that events might have been different. This appears to be a spontaneous behavior, with considerable adaptive value. Nevertheless, counterfactual thinking may also engender systematic biases in various judgment tasks, such as allocating blame for a mishap, or deciding on the appropriate compensation to a victim.