Publications by authors named "Daniele Nosenzo"

Dishonest behaviours such as tax evasion impose significant societal costs. Ex ante honesty oaths-commitments to honesty before action-have been proposed as interventions to counteract dishonest behaviour, but the heterogeneity in findings across operationalizations calls their effectiveness into question. We tested 21 honesty oaths (including a baseline oath)-proposed, evaluated and selected by 44 expert researchers-and a no-oath condition in a megastudy involving 21,506 UK and US participants from Prolific.

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Article Synopsis
  • The COVID-19 pandemic has led countries to implement lockdowns to protect public health, but these measures come with significant economic costs. Mobile phone apps for contact tracing have been proposed as a potential exit strategy, though privacy concerns may impact public acceptance.
  • This study aims to assess the acceptability of a COVID-19 contact-tracing app across five countries by surveying nearly 6,000 participants from France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US, measuring their willingness to use the app based on different installation methods.
  • Results indicate that there is strong support for the contact-tracing app in all surveyed countries and demographics, regardless of local COVID-19 mortality rates; however, concerns around cybersecurity, privacy, and
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We study the relative effectiveness of contracts that are framed either in terms of bonuses or penalties. In one set of treatments, subjects know at the time of effort provision whether they have achieved the bonus/avoided the penalty. In another set of treatments, subjects only learn the success of their performance at the end of the task.

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We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agent's effort is influenced by the effort choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents.

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