Dual systems for all: Higher-order, role-based relational reasoning as a uniquely derived feature of human cognition.

Hoerl and McCormack demonstrate that although animals possess a sophisticated temporal updating system, there is no evidence that they also possess a temporal reasoning system. This important case study is directly related to the broader claim that although animals are manifestly capable of first-order (perceptually-based) relational reasoning, they lack the capacity for higher-order, role-based relational reasoning. We argue this distinction applies to all domains of cognition.

Meta-analytic techniques reveal that corvid causal reasoning in the Aesop's Fable paradigm is driven by trial-and-error learning.

The classic Aesop's fable, Crow and the Pitcher, has inspired a major line of research in comparative cognition. Over the past several years, five articles (over 32 experiments) have examined the ability of corvids (e.g.

The relationship between joint attention and theory of mind in neurotypical adults.

Joint attention (JA) is hypothesized to have a close relationship with developing theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. We tested the co-occurrence of ToM and JA in social interactions between adults with no reported history of psychiatric illness or neurodevelopmental disorders. Participants engaged in an experimental task that encouraged nonverbal communication, including JA, and also ToM activity.

Constraints on the exploitation of the functional properties of objects in expert tool-using chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Many species exploit immediately apparent dimensions of objects during tool use and manufacture and operate over internal perceptual representations of objects (they move and reorient objects in space, have rules of operation to deform or modify objects, etc). Humans, however, actively test for functionally relevant object properties before such operations begin, even when no previous percepts of a particular object's qualities in the domain have been established. We hypothesize that such prospective diagnostic interventions are a human specialization of cognitive function that has been entirely overlooked in the neuropsychological literature.

Brief Report: Theory of Mind, Relational Reasoning, and Social Responsiveness in Children With and Without Autism: Demonstration of Feasibility for a Larger-Scale Study.

Understanding the underpinnings of social responsiveness and theory of mind (ToM) will enhance our knowledge of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). We hypothesize that higher-order relational reasoning (higher-order RR: reasoning necessitating integration of relationships among multiple variables) is necessary but not sufficient for ToM, and that social responsiveness varies independently of higher-order RR. A pilot experiment tested these hypotheses in n = 17 children, 3-14, with and without ASD.

Brief Report: Chimpanzee Social Responsiveness Scale (CSRS) Detects Individual Variation in Social Responsiveness for Captive Chimpanzees.

Comparative studies of social responsiveness, a core impairment in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), will enhance our understanding of typical and atypical social behavior. We previously reported a quantitative, cross-species (human-chimpanzee) social responsiveness measure, which included the development of the Chimpanzee Social Responsiveness Scale (CSRS). Here, we augment our prior CSRS sample with 25 zoo chimpanzees at three sites: combined N = 54.

Theory of Mind experience sampling in typical adults.

We explored the frequency with which typical adults make Theory of Mind (ToM) attributions, and under what circumstances these attributions occur. We used an experience sampling method to query 30 typical adults about their everyday thoughts. Participants carried a Personal Data Assistant (PDA) that prompted them to categorize their thoughts as Action, Mental State, or Miscellaneous at approximately 30 pseudo-random times during a continuous 10-h period.

Impaired eye region search accuracy in children with autistic spectrum disorders.

To explore mechanisms underlying reduced fixation of eyes in autism, children with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) and typically developing children were tested in five visual search experiments: simple color feature; color-shape conjunction; face in non-face objects; mouth region; and eye region. No group differences were found for reaction time profile shapes in any of the five experiments, suggesting intact basic search mechanics in children with ASD. Contrary to early reports in the literature, but consistent with other more recent findings, we observed no superiority for conjunction search in children with ASD.

Analysis of magnetic gradients to study gravitropism.

Premise Of The Study: Gravitropism typically is generated by dense particles that respond to gravity. Experimental stimulation by high-gradient magnetic fields provides a new approach to selectively manipulate the gravisensing system.

Methods: The movement of corn, wheat, and potato starch grains in suspension was examined with videomicroscopy during parabolic flights that generated 20 to 25 s of weightlessness.

So, are we the massively lucky species?

We are in vehement agreement with most of Vaesen's key claims. But Vaesen fails to consider or rebut the possibility that there are deep causal dependencies among the various cognitive traits he identifies as uniquely human. We argue that "higher-order relational reasoning" is one such linchpin trait in the evolution of human tool use, social intelligence, language, and culture.

Carryover effect of joint attention to repeated events in chimpanzees and young children.

Gaze following is a fundamental component of triadic social interaction which includes events and an object shared with other individuals and is found in both human and nonhuman primates. Most previous work has focused only on the immediate reaction after following another’s gaze. In contrast, this study investigated whether gaze following is retained after the observation of the other’s gaze shift, whether this retainment differs between species and age groups, and whether the retainment depends on the nature of the preceding events.

Comparative investigations of manual action representations: evidence that chimpanzees represent the costs of potential future actions involving tools.

The ability to adjust one's ongoing actions in the anticipation of forthcoming task demands is considered as strong evidence for the existence of internal action representations. Studies of action selection in tool use reveal that the behaviours that we choose in the present moment differ depending on what we intend to do next. Further, they point to a specialized role for mechanisms within the human cerebellum and dominant left cerebral hemisphere in representing the likely sensory costs of intended future actions.

Initial description of a quantitative, cross-species (chimpanzee-human) social responsiveness measure.

Objective: Comparative studies of social responsiveness, an ability that is impaired in autism spectrum disorders, can inform our understanding of both autism and the cognitive architecture of social behavior. Because there is no existing quantitative measure of social responsiveness in chimpanzees, we generated a quantitative, cross-species (human-chimpanzee) social responsiveness measure.

Method: We translated the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS), an instrument that quantifies human social responsiveness, into an analogous instrument for chimpanzees.

Chimpanzees' context-dependent tool use provides evidence for separable representations of hand and tool even during active use within peripersonal space.

Considerable attention has been devoted to behaviors in which tools are used to perform actions in extrapersonal space by extending the reach. Evidence suggests that these behaviors result in an expansion of the body schema and peripersonal space. However, humans often use tools to perform tasks within peripersonal space that cannot be accomplished with the hands.

Darwin's mistake: explaining the discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds.

Over the last quarter century, the dominant tendency in comparative cognitive psychology has been to emphasize the similarities between human and nonhuman minds and to downplay the differences as "one of degree and not of kind" (Darwin 1871). In the present target article, we argue that Darwin was mistaken: the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. To wit, there is a significant discontinuity in the degree to which human and nonhuman animals are able to approximate the higher-order, systematic, relational capabilities of a physical symbol system (PSS) (Newell 1980).

Chimpanzees do not take advantage of very low cost opportunities to deliver food to unrelated group members.

We conducted experiments on two populations of chimpanzees, , to determine whether they would take advantage of opportunities to provide food rewards to familiar group members at little cost to themselves. In both of the experiments described here, chimpanzees were able to deliver identical rewards to themselves and to other members of their social groups. We compared the chimpanzees' behaviour when they were paired with another chimpanzee and when they were alone.

Differences in How 12- and 24-Month-Olds Interpret the Gaze of Adults.

This study examined the hypothesis that toddlers interpret an adult's head turn as evidence that the adult was looking at something, whereas younger infants interpret gaze based on an expectancy that an interesting object will be present on the side to which the adult has turned. Infants of 12 months and toddlers of 24 months were first shown that an adult head turn to the side predicted the activation of a remote-controlled toy on that side of the room. After this connection had been demonstrated, participants were assigned to 2 conditions.

On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything remotely resembling a 'theory of mind'.

After decades of effort by some of our brightest human and non-human minds, there is still little consensus on whether or not non-human animals understand anything about the unobservable mental states of other animals or even what it would mean for a non-verbal animal to understand the concept of a 'mental state'. In the present paper, we confront four related and contentious questions head-on: (i) What exactly would it mean for a non-verbal organism to have an 'understanding' or a 'representation' of another animal's mental state? (ii) What should (and should not) count as compelling empirical evidence that a non-verbal cognitive agent has a system for understanding or forming representations about mental states in a functionally adaptive manner? (iii) Why have the kind of experimental protocols that are currently in vogue failed to produce compelling evidence that non-human animals possess anything even remotely resembling a theory of mind? (iv) What kind of experiments could, at least in principle, provide compelling evidence for such a system in a non-verbal organism?

Causal cognition in human and nonhuman animals: a comparative, critical review.

In this article, we review some of the most provocative experimental results to have emerged from comparative labs in the past few years, starting with research focusing on contingency learning and finishing with experiments exploring nonhuman animals' understanding of causal-logical relations. Although the theoretical explanation for these results is often inchoate, a clear pattern nevertheless emerges. The comparative evidence does not fit comfortably into either the traditional associationist or inferential alternatives that have dominated comparative debate for many decades now.

Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group members.

Humans are an unusually prosocial species-we vote, give blood, recycle, give tithes and punish violators of social norms. Experimental evidence indicates that people willingly incur costs to help strangers in anonymous one-shot interactions, and that altruistic behaviour is motivated, at least in part, by empathy and concern for the welfare of others (hereafter referred to as other-regarding preferences). In contrast, cooperative behaviour in non-human primates is mainly limited to kin and reciprocating partners, and is virtually never extended to unfamiliar individuals.

Chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) use of gaze cues in object-choice tasks: different methods yield different results.

To assess the influence of different procedures on chimpanzees' performance in object-choice tasks, five adult chimpanzees were tested using three experimenter-given cues to food location: gazing, glancing, and pointing. These cues were delivered to the subjects in an identical fashion but were deployed within the context of two distinct meta-procedures that have been previously employed with this species with conflicting results. In one procedure, the subjects entered the test unit and approached the experimenter (who had already established the cue) on each trial.

Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human?

Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states - that is, do they possess a 'theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states.

An 8-year longitudinal study of mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

In a previous cross-sectional study of mirror self-recognition involving 92 chimpanzees, Povinelli et al. [Journal of Comparative Psychology 107 (1993) 347] reported a peak in the proportion of animals exhibiting self-recognition in the adolescent/young adult sample (8-15 years), with 75% being classified as positive. In contrast, only 26% of the older animals (16-39 years) were classified as positive, suggesting a marked decline in self-recognition in middle to late adulthood.

Psychological diversity in chimpanzees and humans: new longitudinal assessments of chimpanzees' understanding of attention.

We present the results of 5 experiments that assessed 7 chimpanzees' understanding of the visual experiences of others. The research was conducted when the animals were adolescents (7-8 years of age) and adults (12 years of age). The experiments examined their ability to recognize the equivalence between visual and tactile modes of gaining the attention of others (Exp.