How Lévy Flights Triggered by the Presence of Defectors Affect Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Games.

Cooperation among individuals has been key to sustaining societies. However, natural selection favors defection over cooperation. Cooperation can be favored when the mobility of individuals allows cooperators to form a cluster (or group).

Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games.

Long-term cooperation, competition, or exploitation among individuals can be modeled through repeated games. In repeated games, Press and Dyson discovered zero-determinant (ZD) strategies that enforce a special relationship between two players. This special relationship implies that a ZD player can unilaterally impose a linear payoff relationship to the opponent regardless of the opponent's strategies.

Conditions for the existence of zero-determinant strategies under observation errors in repeated games.

Repeated games are useful models to analyze long term interactions of living species and complex social phenomena. Zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in repeated games discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 enforce a linear payoff relationship between a focal player and the opponent. This linear relationship can be set arbitrarily by a ZD player.

Winning by hiding behind others: An analysis of speed skating data.

In some athletic races, such as cycling and types of speed skating races, athletes have to complete a relatively long distance at a high speed in the presence of direct opponents. To win such a race, athletes are motivated to hide behind others to suppress energy consumption before a final moment of the race. This situation seems to produce a social dilemma: players want to hide behind others, whereas if a group of players attempts to do so, they may all lose to other players that overtake them.