Equity and efficiency effects of flat premiums.

This paper analyzes the impact of flat premiums on equity and efficiency within a regulated market. We examine the consequences of shifting from a risk-adjusted premium model to a flat premium system, particularly focusing on how this shift affects different income groups and market efficiency. Using a combination of theoretical modeling and empirical analysis, we find that flat premiums may lead to increased cross-subsidization among participants, with notable effects on both equity and efficiency.

Health care reform, adverse selection and health insurance choice.

This paper builds and estimates a dynamic choice model to examine the impact on health insurance selection of Chile's GES health care reform. This program provides guarantees in coverage and benefits to several health conditions in the context of a market where public and private health insurers co-exist. Structural differences in premiums, benefits and out-of-pocket medical costs across systems may have caused adverse selection problems.

Health insurance selection in Chile: a cross-sectional and panel analysis.

In Chile, workers are mandated to choose either public or private health insurance coverage. Although private insurance premiums depend on health risk, public insurance premiums are solely linked to income. This structure implies that individuals with higher health risks may tend to avoid private insurance, leaving the public insurance system responsible for their care.

Public versus private: evidence on health insurance selection.

This paper models health insurance choice in Chile (public versus private) as a dynamic, stochastic process, where individuals consider premiums, expected out-of pocket costs, personal characteristics and preferences. Insurance amenities and restrictions against pre-existing conditions among private insurers introduce asymmetry to the model. We confirm that the public system services a less healthy and wealthy population (adverse selection for public insurance).