The End of Life Choice Act: a proposed implementation and research agenda.

Aim: This article outlines the End of Life Choice Act 2019. It highlights some of the key implementation issues to ensure the system operates safely and equitably after the Act comes into force. It also identifies priorities for research to ensure issues are detected and provision of assisted dying (AD) is monitored.

Assisted dying and evidence-based law-making: a critical analysis of an article's role in New Zealand's referendum.

Aim: To critically analyse the reliability of an article which claims to be evidence that the End of Life Choice Act 2019 provides a "potential hotspot for family, community and social discord that may not be easily remedied" should the legislation receive public support in New Zealand's September 2020 referendum.

Methods: The subject article was reviewed multiple times by all authors and critiqued against three criteria: a reliability pyramid developed to weigh evidence about assisted dying; principles that guide the conduct of social science research; and the use of reliable and current social science literature to support factual claims.

Results: The study being analysed involved a single interview and so is located at the second bottom row of the reliability pyramid.

Doctors' rights to conscientiously object to refer patients to abortion service providers.

After five decades of restrictive laws, New Zealand is on the cusp of law reform that may result in abortion being treated as a health, rather than a criminal, matter. Given this possible liberalisation, a pressing issue is the way in which 'conscientious objection' (CO) will be accommodated within the new legislative landscape. In this context, CO constitutes a health provider refusing, on the grounds of personal conscience, to provide care that, although legal and potentially clinically appropriate, conflicts with their personal moral views.

Can facilitated aid in dying be permitted by 'double effect'? Some reflections from a recent New Zealand case.

While the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) remains controversial in ethical circles, it continues to be recognised in common law courts. In 2015, the High Court of New Zealand became the latest to acknowledge the existence of the DDE, in a case that challenged the prohibition on physician assisted dying. In so doing, the possibility was raised that the DDE could potentially be used in an untraditional way to provide a prima facie justification of "facilitated aid in dying" (FAID) in some cases.

Genes, blame and loss of control: is there a place in criminal law for a 'genetic defense'?

In 2002, Caspi and colleagues proposed that a specific gene by environment (GxE) interaction is related to antisocial tendencies. Since then, a substantial body of literature has examined the potential implications of such a correlation for the criminal justice system, and in particular, for the attribution of responsibility and blame that lies at the core of that system. It is probably accurate to say that the majority position among criminal theorists is that evidence of such a nature does not undermine or seriously challenge existing notions of responsibility, and could not constitute a full defense to a criminal charge - although it may have a role to play in sentencing.

Medical regulation of cognitive enhancement devices: some concerns.

The authors present a cogent and detailed case for altering the Medical Devices Directive to allow regulation of cognitive enhancement devices (CEDs). Protection against significant risk of harm, especially for the vulnerable, and promotion of benefit through informed use of CEDs are all good features of the proposal. However, the pre-market approval process has limitations, which we explore.

Dangerous patients and duties to warn: a European human rights perspective.

The recent case of David Bradley, who shot and killed four members of his family after telling his doctor he 'wanted to kill someone', has raised the question of whether a healthcare professional could ever be held liable for failing to take steps to constrain a potentially dangerous patient. Until recently, it was considered that the United Kingdom courts would be reluctant to impose a duty to protect third parties. However, the European Court of Human Rights' decision in Osman v UK--while not directly concerning healthcare professionals--has opened the door for just such a duty.

A Tarasoff for Europe? A European Human Rights perspective on the duty to protect.

It has long been recognised by British courts that a psychiatrist can be permitted to depart from his/her duty of confidentiality, in order to issue a warning where a patient is deemed to present a real and serious threat to other parties. Until recently, however, it seemed that s/he would not be bound to give such a warning, or to take other steps to protect third parties. The approach adopted throughout much of the USA, and famously expounded in the Tarasoff judgment, appeared to have no relevance to British law.

Use of preimplantation genetic diagnosis to produce tissue donors: an irreconcilable dichotomy?

In 2002, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) published its decision in the case of Raj and Shahana Hashmi. The couple had sought to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to have a child that could be a viable donor for their son, Zain, who has thalassaemia. The HFEA decided that PGD could, in the present case, go ahead.