Price Indices and the Value of Innovation with Heterogenous Patients.

Many countries use uniform cost-effectiveness criteria to determine whether to adopt a new medical technology for the entire population. This approach assumes homogeneous preferences for expected health benefits and side effects. We examine whether new prescription drugs generate welfare gains when accounting for heterogeneous preferences by constructing quality-adjusted price indices in the market for colorectal cancer drug treatments.

Can amputation save the hospital? The impact of the Medicare Rural Flexibility Program on demand and welfare.

This paper seeks to understand the impact of the Medicare Rural Hospital Flexibility (Flex) Program on hospital choice and consumer welfare for rural residents. The Flex Program created a new class of hospital, the Critical Access Hospital (CAH), which receives more generous Medicare reimbursements in return for limits on capacity and length of stay. We find that conversion to CAH status resulted in a 4.

Quality-adjusted cost of care: a meaningful way to measure growth in innovation cost versus the value of health gains.

Technology drives both health care spending and health improvement. Yet policy makers rarely see measures of cost growth that account for both effects. To fill this gap, we present the quality-adjusted cost of care, which illustrates cost growth net of growth in the value of health improvements, measured as survival gains multiplied by the value of survival.

Paying Attention or Paying Too Much in Medicare Part D.

We study whether people became less likely to switch Medicare prescription drug plans (PDPs) due to more options and more time in Part D. Panel data for a random 20 percent sample of enrollees from 2006--2010 show that 50 percent were not in their original PDPs by 2010. Individuals switched PDPs in response to higher costs of their status quo plans, saving them money.

Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D.

Under Medicare Part D, senior citizens choose prescription drug insurance offered by numerous private insurers. We examine nonpoor enrollees' actions in 2006 and 2007 using panel data. Our sample reduced overspending by $298 on average, with gains by 81 percent of them.