Evidence that altercentric biases in a continuous false belief task depend on highlighting the agent's belief.

As social beings, we excel at understanding what other people think or believe. We even seem to be influenced by the belief of others in situations where it is irrelevant to our current tasks. Such altercentric interference has been proposed to reflect implicit belief processing.

Infants' Social Evaluation of Helpers and Hinderers: A Large-Scale, Multi-Lab, Coordinated Replication Study.

Evaluating whether someone's behavior is praiseworthy or blameworthy is a fundamental human trait. A seminal study by Hamlin and colleagues in 2007 suggested that the ability to form social evaluations based on third-party interactions emerges within the first year of life: infants preferred a character who helped, over hindered, another who tried but failed to climb a hill. This sparked a new line of inquiry into the origins of social evaluations; however, replication attempts have yielded mixed results.

An fMRI study on alexithymia and affective state recognition in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test.

Recognizing others' affective states is essential for successful social interactions. Alexithymia, characterized by difficulties in identifying and describing one's own emotions, has been linked to deficits in recognizing emotions and mental states in others. To investigate how neural correlates of affective state recognition are affected by different facets of alexithymia, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with 53 healthy participants (aged 19-36 years, 51% female) using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) and three different measures of alexithymia [Toronto Structured Interview for Alexithymia (TSIA), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20), and Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire].

Evidence against implicit belief processing in a blindfold task.

Understanding what other people think is crucial to our everyday interactions. We seem to be affected by the perspective of others even in situations where it is irrelevant to us. This intrusion from others' perspectives has been referred to as altercentric bias and has been suggested to reflect implicit belief processing.

Validation of an open source, remote web-based eye-tracking method (WebGazer) for research in early childhood.

Measuring eye movements remotely via the participant's webcam promises to be an attractive methodological addition to in-person eye-tracking in the lab. However, there is a lack of systematic research comparing remote web-based eye-tracking with in-lab eye-tracking in young children. We report a multi-lab study that compared these two measures in an anticipatory looking task with toddlers using WebGazer.

An initial but receding altercentric bias in preverbal infants' memory.

Young learners would seem to face a daunting challenge in selecting to what they should attend, a problem that may have been exacerbated in human infants by changes in carrying practices during human evolution. A novel theory proposes that human infant cognition has an altercentric bias whereby early in life, infants prioritize encoding events that are the targets of others' attention. We tested for this bias by asking whether, when the infant and an observing agent have a conflicting perspective on an object's location, the co-witnessed location is better remembered.

Children's syntax is supported by the maturation of BA44 at 4 years, but of the posterior STS at 3 years of age.

Within the first years of life, children learn major aspects of their native language. However, the ability to process complex sentence structures, a core faculty in human language called syntax, emerges only slowly. A milestone in syntax acquisition is reached around the age of 4 years, when children learn a variety of syntactic concepts.

Timing matters: disentangling the neurocognitive sequence of mentalizing.

A recent electrocorticographic study by Tan et al. makes an important contribution to understanding the processes involved in mentalizing by adding the temporal dimension to the brain network of mentalizing. Combined with multivariate methods, this approach has the potential to unveil the precise representations underlying mentalizing and their functional interplay.

Maturational Indices of the Cognitive Control Network Are Associated with Inhibitory Control in Early Childhood.

Goal-directed behavior crucially relies on our capacity to suppress impulses and predominant behavioral responses. This ability, called inhibitory control, emerges in early childhood with marked improvements between 3 and 4 years. Here, we ask which brain structures are related to the emergence of this critical ability.

Cognitive dissonance from 2 years of age: Toddlers', but not infants', blind choices induce preferences.

As adults, not only do we choose what we prefer, we also tend to adapt our preferences according to our previous choices. We do this even when choosing blindly and we could not have had any previous preference for the option we chose. These blind choice-induced preferences are thought to result from cognitive dissonance as an effort to reconcile our choices and values.

Evidence for goal- and mixed evidence for false belief-based action prediction in 2- to 4-year-old children: A large-scale longitudinal anticipatory looking replication study.

Unsuccessful replication attempts of paradigms assessing children's implicit tracking of false beliefs have instigated the debate on whether or not children have an implicit understanding of false beliefs before the age of four. A novel multi-trial anticipatory looking false belief paradigm yielded evidence of implicit false belief reasoning in 3- to 4-year-old children using a combined score of two false belief conditions (Grosse Wiesmann, C., Friederici, A.

Understanding the self in relation to others: Infants spontaneously map another's face to their own at 16-26 months.

The current study probed whether infants understand themselves in relation to others. Infants aged 16-26 months (n = 102) saw their parent wearing a sticker on their forehead or cheek, depending on experimental condition, placed unwitnessed by the child. Infants then received a sticker themselves, and their spontaneous behavior was coded.

Positive emotion enhances conflict processing in preschoolers.

The rapid detection and resolution of conflict between opposing action tendencies is crucial for our ability to engage in goal-directed behavior. Research in adults suggests that emotions can serve as a "relevance detector" that alarms attentional and sensory systems, thereby leading to more efficient conflict processing. In contrast, previous research in children has almost exclusively stressed the impeding influence of emotion on the attentional system, as suggested by the protracted development of performance in "hot" executive function tasks.

Development of functional network architecture explains changes in children's altruistically motivated helping.

Childhood is marked by profound changes in prosocial behaviour. The underlying motivational mechanisms remain poorly understood. We investigated the development of altruistically motivated helping in middle childhood and the neurocognitive and -affective mechanisms driving this development.

Does syntax play a role in Theory of Mind development before the age of 3 years?

Language plays an important role in Theory of Mind development. Specifically, longitudinal and training studies indicate that the acquisition of complement syntax has an effect on three- to five-year-old children's mastery of the concept of false belief. There is evidence for both a beginning explicit understanding of the mind and mastery of complement syntax in children before their third birthday.

Two systems for thinking about others' thoughts in the developing brain.

Human social interaction crucially relies on the ability to infer what other people think. Referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM), this ability has long been argued to emerge around 4 y of age when children start passing traditional verbal ToM tasks. This developmental dogma has recently been questioned by nonverbal ToM tasks passed by infants younger than 2 y of age.

Longitudinal evidence for 4-year-olds' but not 2- and 3-year-olds' false belief-related action anticipation.

Recently, infants younger than 2 years have been shown to display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with a false belief. The developmental trajectory of these early-developing abilities and their robustness, however, remain a matter of debate. Here, we tested children longitudinally from 2 to 4 years of age with an established anticipatory looking false belief task, and found a significant developmental change between the ages of 3 and 4 years.

White matter maturation is associated with the emergence of Theory of Mind in early childhood.

The ability to attribute mental states to other individuals is crucial for human cognition. A milestone of this ability is reached around the age of 4, when children start understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. The neural basis supporting this critical step is currently unknown.

Implicit and explicit false belief development in preschool children.

The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks.