Pathologizing Pathos: Suffering, Technocentrism, and Law in Twentieth-Century American Medicine.

In the second half of the twentieth century, concerns about problems in the doctor-patient relationship gave way to a new medical discourse on suffering, owed largely to the work of American physician Eric Cassell. This article tracks the development of his theory of suffering and its global success in transforming tragic medical experiences into diagnosable clinical entities. Beginning with his intellectual development in the 1960s, this article traces Cassell's initial interest in suffering first to his early research on truth-telling and autonomy, followed by his pioneering work in bioethics.

Existential spectrum of suffering: concepts and moral valuations for assessing intensity and tolerability.

This paper has two aims. The first is to defend a recent critique of the leading medical theory of suffering, which alleges too narrow a focus on violent experiences of suffering. Although sympathetic to this critique, I claim that it lacks a counterexample of the kinds of experiences the leading theory is said to neglect.

Associations of suffering with facets of health and well-being among working adults: longitudinal evidence from two samples.

Suffering is an experiential state that every person encounters at one time or another, yet little is known about suffering and its consequences for the health and well-being of nonclinical adult populations. In a pair of longitudinal studies, we used two waves of data from garment factory workers (Study 1 [T1: 2017, T2: 2019]: n = 344) and flight attendants (Study 2 [T1: 2017/2018, T2: 2020]: n = 1402) to examine the prospective associations of suffering with 16 outcomes across different domains of health and well-being: physical health, health behavior, mental health, psychological well-being, character strengths, and social well-being. The primary analysis involved a series of regression analyses in which each T2 outcome was regressed on overall suffering assessed at T1, adjusting for relevant sociodemographic characteristics and the baseline value (or close proxy) of the outcome assessed at T1.

An intellectual history of suffering in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 1978-2014.

Suffering is an important theme in many bioethical debates, yet little historical research is available to contextualise ideas about it. My article proposes a preliminary intellectual history of suffering in bioethics using the field's most trusted tertiary work, the four editions of the (1978-2004), later renamed (2014). In the first edition, I find suffering roughly conceptualised as either the negation of a good or as a pain.

What really is the nature of suffering? Three problems with Eric Cassell's concept of distress.

Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person's severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell's theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell's account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, 'distress' just means 'suffering' or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell's theory circular.

Pain versus suffering: a distinction currently without a difference.

My paper challenges an influential distinction between pain and suffering put forward by physician-ethicist, Eric Cassell. I argue that Cassell's distinction is philosophically untenable because he contrasts suffering with an outdated theory of pain. In particular, Cassell focuses on one type of pain, the interpretation of nociception induced by noxious stimuli such as heat or sharp objects; yet since the late 1970s, pain scientists have rendered both nociception and noxious stimuli unnecessary for pain.