The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex in reward valuation and future thinking during intertemporal choice.

Intertemporal choices require trade-offs between short-term and long-term outcomes. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage causes steep discounting of future rewards (delay discounting [DD]) and impoverished episodic future thinking (EFT). The role of vmPFC in reward valuation, EFT, and their interaction during intertemporal choice is still unclear.

Does Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Damage Really Increase Impulsiveness? Delay and Probability Discounting in Patients with Focal Lesions.

If the tendency to discount rewards reflects individuals' general level of impulsiveness, then the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards should be negatively correlated: The less a person is able to wait for delayed rewards, the more they should take chances on receiving probabilistic rewards. It has been suggested that damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) increases individuals' impulsiveness, but both intertemporal choice and risky choice have only recently been assayed in the same patients with vMPFC damage. Here, we assess both delay and probability discounting in individuals with vMPFC damage (n = 8) or with medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage (n = 10), and in age- and education-matched controls (n = 30).

A method for estimating coherence of molecular mechanisms in major human disease and traits.

Background: Phenotypes such as height and intelligence, are thought to be a product of the collective effects of multiple phenotype-associated genes and interactions among their protein products. High/low degree of interactions is suggestive of coherent/random molecular mechanisms, respectively. Comparing the degree of interactions may help to better understand the coherence of phenotype-specific molecular mechanisms and the potential for therapeutic intervention.

Is it time? Episodic imagining and the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards in young and older adults.

Remembering and imagining specific, personal experiences can help shape our decisions. For example, cues to imagine future events can reduce delay discounting (i.e.

The Coherence Problem: Finding Meaning in GWAS Complexity.

Genome wide association studies (GWAS) for behavioral traits and psychiatric disorders have inspired both confident optimism and withering criticism. Although many recent findings from well powered GWAS have been replicated in independent data sets, the genes identified have pinned down few if any underlying causal mechanisms. Therefore, a key issue is whether or not the genes implicated by GWAS form a coherent story on their own and thus could in principle lead to insight into the biological mechanisms underlying the trait or disorder.

Episodic memory and the witness trump card.

We accept Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) causal claim that episodic memory provides humans with the means for evaluating the veracity of reports about non-occurrent events. We reject their evolutionary argument that this is the proper function of episodic memory. We explore three intriguing implications of the causal claim, for cognitive neuropsychology, comparative psychology, and philosophy.

Narrative construction is intact in episodic amnesia.

Autobiographical remembering and future imagining overlap in their underlying psychological and neurological mechanisms. The hippocampus and surrounding regions within the medial temporal lobes (MTL), known for their role in forming and maintaining autobiographical episodic memories, are also thought to play an essential role in fictitious and future constructions. Amnesic individuals with bilateral hippocampal damage cannot reconstruct their past personal experiences and also have severe deficits in the ability to construct coherent fictitious or future narratives.

The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations.

In "What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?" (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples.

A registration problem for functional fingerprinting.

Functional fingerprints aggregate over heterogeneous tasks, protocols, and controls. The appearance of functional diversity might be explained by task heterogeneity and conceptual imprecision.

Moral judgment in episodic amnesia.

To investigate the role of episodic thought about the past and future in moral judgment, we administered a well-established moral judgment battery to individuals with hippocampal damage and deficits in episodic thought (insert Greene et al. 2001). Healthy controls select deontological answers in high-conflict moral scenarios more frequently when they vividly imagine themselves in the scenarios than when they imagine scenarios abstractly, at some personal remove.

Cueing the personal future to reduce discounting in intertemporal choice: Is episodic prospection necessary?

How does the ability to imagine detailed future experiences (i.e., episodic prospection) contribute to choices between immediate and delayed rewards? Individuals with amnesia do not show abnormally steep discounting in intertemporal choice, suggesting that neither medial temporal lobe (MTL) integrity nor episodic prospection is required for the valuation of future rewards (Kwan et al.

The spine problem: finding a function for dendritic spines.

Why do neurons have dendritic spines? This question-the heart of what Yuste calls "the spine problem"-presupposes that why-questions of this sort have scientific answers: that empirical findings can favor or count against claims about why neurons have spines. Here we show how such questions can receive empirical answers. We construe such why-questions as questions about how spines make a difference to the behavior of some mechanism that we take to be significant.

An Allais paradox without mental time travel.

The capacity to anticipate future experiences of regret has been hypothesized to explain otherwise irrational aspects of human decision-making, including the certainty effect (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Econometrica 47:263-291) and the common ratio effect (Allais (1953) Econometrica 21:503-546). The anticipated regret hypothesis predicts that individuals incapable of episodically imagining their personal futures, as has been reported for people with extensive damage to medial temporal lobe structures and resulting deficits in episodic thought, should be immune to these effects. We report that K.

Remembering Mr B.

In the accompanying translation and film, Gustav Störring describes the psychological profile of Mr. B. (Franz Breundl), a victim of carbon monoxide poisoning with a nearly complete short-term memory deficit.

Individuals with episodic amnesia are not stuck in time.

The metaphor that individuals with episodic amnesia due to hippocampal damage are "stuck in time" persists in science, philosophy, and everyday life despite mounting evidence that episodic amnesia can spare many central aspects of temporal consciousness. Here we describe some of this evidence, focusing specifically on KC, one of the most thoroughly documented and severe cases of episodic amnesia on record. KC understands the concept of time, knows that it passes, and can orient himself with respect to his personal past and future.

Dissociations in future thinking following hippocampal damage: evidence from discounting and time perspective in episodic amnesia.

Recollecting past experiences and imagining future experiences activate a common set of brain regions that includes the hippocampus (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007), and both functions are impaired in people with compromised hippocampal function (Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Tulving, 1985). These findings indicate a role for the hippocampus that extends beyond declarative memory. However, a case study revealed that a person with extensive medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage and episodic amnesia was able to forgo smaller, immediate rewards for a larger future payoff to a degree similar to control participants (Kwan et al.

Future decision-making without episodic mental time travel.

Deficits in episodic memory are associated with deficits in the ability to imagine future experiences (i.e., mental time travel).

Beyond reduction: mechanisms, multifield integration and the unity of neuroscience.

Philosophers of neuroscience have traditionally described interfield integration using reduction models. Such models describe formal inferential relations between theories at different levels. I argue against reduction and for a mechanistic model of interfield integration.

The making of a memory mechanism.

Long-Term Publication (LTP) is a kind of synaptic plasticity that many contemporary neuroscientists believe is a component in mechanisms of memory. This essay describes the discovery of LTP and the development of the LTP research program. The story begins in the 1950's with the discovery of synaptic plasticity in the hippocampus (a medial temporal lobe structure now associated with memory), and it ends in 1973 with the publication of three papers sketching the future course of the LTP research program.