Publications by authors named "C J Dance"

Article Synopsis
  • The modern concept of mental imagery involves sensory representations that mimic perception without being derived from it, along with a personal experience tied to that imagery.
  • Neuroimaging studies reveal that these sensory representations occur in the primary visual cortex (V1) and display similarities to actual perception.
  • Research comparing individuals who can visualize (visualizers) and those who cannot (aphantasics) found that while V1 can still decode sound content in aphantasics during passive listening, it fails during voluntary imagery, indicating a distinction between sensory representations and subjective experiences.
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There is a growing interest in the relationship between mental images and attentional templates as both are considered pictorial representations that involve similar neural mechanisms. Here, we investigated the role of mental imagery in the automatic implementation of attentional templates and their effect on involuntary attention. We developed a novel version of the contingent capture paradigm designed to encourage the generation of a new template on each trial and measure contingent spatial capture by a template-matching visual feature (color).

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Aphantasia is a neurocognitive phenomenon affecting voluntary visual imagery, such that it is either entirely absent, or markedly impaired. Using both the social and medical models of disability, this article discusses the extent to which aphantasia can be understood as a disorder or just a form of neutral neurodivergence, given that imagery plays a central role in thinking and memory for most other people. Preliminary school performance data are presented, showing that low imagery does not necessarily complicate life, especially given compensatory strategies and low societal barriers.

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People with aphantasia have a markedly impaired ability to form visual images in the mind's eye. Here, by testing people with and without aphantasia, we examine the relationship between visual imagery and face processing. We show that aphantasics have weaker face recognition than people with visual imagery, using both self-report (Prosopagnosia Index) and behavioural measures (Cambridge Face Memory Test).

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