Non-signing children's assessment of telicity in sign language.

Adults with no knowledge of sign languages can perceive distinctive markers that signal event boundedness (telicity), suggesting that telicity is a cognitively natural semantic feature that can be marked iconically (Strickland et al., 2015). This study asks if non-signing children (5-year-olds) can also link telicity to iconic markers in sign.

Moralization and extremism robustly amplify myside sharing.

We explored whether moralization and attitude extremity may amplify a preference to share politically congruent ("myside") partisan news and what types of targeted interventions may reduce this tendency. Across 12 online experiments ( = 6,989), we examined decisions to share news touching on the divisive issues of gun control, abortion, gender and racial equality, and immigration. Myside sharing was systematically observed and was consistently amplified when participants (i) moralized and (ii) were attitudinally extreme on the issue.

The Pulfrich solidity illusion: a surprising demonstration of the visual system's tolerance of solidity violations.

Physical objects behave following the principle of solidity: One solid object cannot pass through another. To what extent does the visual system integrate this physical regularity as a prior constraint? A new variant of the Pulfrich effect demonstrates a surprising degree of tolerance for violations of solidity when pitted against motion and depth cues. When adult participants view a pendulum swinging in the fronto-parallel plane with both eyes (one of which was covered by a light-attenuating filter), they falsely perceive the pendulum as swinging in an elliptical path (known as the "Pulfrich effect").

Predicting attitudinal and behavioral responses to COVID-19 pandemic using machine learning.

At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions.

National identity predicts public health support during a global pandemic.

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g.

Boundaries in space and time: Iconic biases across modalities.

The idea that the form of a word reflects information about its meaning has its roots in Platonic philosophy, and has been experimentally investigated for concrete, sensory-based properties since the early 20th century. Here, we provide evidence for an abstract property of 'boundedness' that introduces a systematic, iconic bias on the phonological expectations of a novel lexicon. We show that this abstract property is general across events and objects.

Causality and continuity close the gaps in event representations.

Imagine you see a video of someone pulling back their leg to kick a soccer ball, and then a soccer ball soaring toward a goal. You would likely infer that these scenes are two parts of the same event, and this inference would likely cause you to remember having seen the moment the person kicked the soccer ball, even if that information was never actually presented (Strickland & Keil, 2011, Cognition, 121[3], 409-415). What cues trigger people to "fill in" causal events from incomplete information? Is it due to the experience they have had with soccer balls being kicked toward goals? Is it the visual similarity of the object in both halves of the video? Or is it the mere spatiotemporal continuity of the event? In three experiments, we tested these different potential mechanisms underlying the "filling-in" effect.

Core cognition in adult vision: A surprising discrepancy between the principles of object continuity and solidity.

From an early age, humans intuitively expect physical objects to obey core principles, including continuity (objects follow spatiotemporally continuous paths) and solidity (two solid objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time). These 2 principles are sometimes viewed as deriving from a single overarching "persistence" principle. Indeed, violations of solidity where one solid object seemingly passes through another could theoretically be interpreted as a violation of continuity, with an object "teleporting" to switch places rather than passing through a solid obstacle.

The cognitive foundations of misinformation on science: What we know and what scientists can do about it.

Mis information and misunderstanding of science can partially explained by cognitive processes rooted in our evolutionary past. Science communication can use this knowledge to overcome these cognitive limits.

The origin of pointing: Evidence for the touch hypothesis.

Pointing gestures play a foundational role in human language, but up to now, we have not known where these gestures come from. Here, we investigated the hypothesis that pointing originates in touch. We found, first, that when pointing at a target, children and adults oriented their fingers not as though trying to create an "arrow" that picks out the target but instead as though they were aiming to touch it; second, that when pointing at a target at an angle, participants rotated their wrists to match that angle as they would if they were trying to touch the target; and last, that young children interpret pointing gestures as if they were attempts to touch things, not as arrows.

Encoding of event roles from visual scenes is rapid, spontaneous, and interacts with higher-level visual processing.

A crucial component of event recognition is understanding event roles, i.e. who acted on whom: boy hitting girl is different from girl hitting boy.

The categorical role of structurally iconic signs.

Goldin-Meadow & Brentari (G-M&B) argue that, for sign language users, gesture - in contrast to linguistic sign - is iconic, highly variable, and similar to spoken language co-speech gesture. We discuss two examples (telicity and absolute gradable adjectives) that challenge the use of these criteria for distinguishing sign from gesture.

Cross-linguistic regularities and learner biases reflect "core" mechanics.

Recent research in infant cognition and adult vision suggests that the mechanical object relationships may be more salient and naturally attention grabbing than similar but non-mechanical relationships. Here we examine two novel sources of evidence from language related to this hypothesis. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that adults preferentially infer that the meaning of a novel preposition refers to a mechanical as opposed to a non-mechanical relationship.

Categories and Constraints in Causal Perception.

When object A moves adjacent to a stationary object, B, and in that instant A stops moving and B starts moving, people irresistibly see this as an event in which A causes B to move. Real-world causal collisions are subject to Newtonian constraints on the relative speed of B following the collision, but here we show that perceptual constraints on the relative speed of B (which align imprecisely with Newtonian principles) define two categories of causal events in perception. Using performance-based tasks, we show that triggering events, in which B moves noticeably faster than A, are treated as being categorically different from launching events, in which B does not move noticeably faster than A, and that these categories are unique to causal events (Experiments 1 and 2).

The texture of causal construals: Domain-specific biases shape causal inferences from discourse.

We conducted five sets of experiments asking whether psychological and physical events are construed in broadly different manners concerning the underlying textures of their causes. In Experiments 1a-1d, we found a robust tendency to estimate fewer causes (but not effects) for psychological than for physical events; Experiment 2 showed a similar pattern of results when participants were asked to generate hypothetical causes and effects; Experiment 3 revealed a greater tendency to ascribe linear chains of causes (but not effects) to physical events; Experiment 4 showed that the expectation of linear chains was related to intuitions about deterministic processes; and Experiment 5 showed that simply framing a given ambiguous event in psychological versus physical terms is sufficient to induce changes in the patterns of causal inferences. Adults therefore consistently show a tendency to think about psychological and physical events as being embedded in different kinds of causal structures.

The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity.

We present experimental evidence that people's modes of social interaction influence their construal of truth. Participants who engaged in cooperative interactions were less inclined to agree that there was an objective truth about that topic than were those who engaged in a competitive interaction. Follow-up experiments ruled out alternative explanations and indicated that the changes in objectivity are explained by argumentative mindsets: When people are in cooperative arguments, they see the truth as more subjective.

Language Reflects "Core" Cognition: A New Theory About the Origin of Cross-Linguistic Regularities.

The underlying structures that are common to the world's languages bear an intriguing connection with early emerging forms of "core knowledge" (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), which are frequently studied by infant researchers. In particular, grammatical systems often incorporate distinctions (e.g.

Event representations constrain the structure of language: Sign language as a window into universally accessible linguistic biases.

According to a theoretical tradition dating back to Aristotle, verbs can be classified into two broad categories. Telic verbs (e.g.

Visual perception involves event-type representations: The case of containment versus occlusion.

Recent infant cognition research suggests that core knowledge involves event-type representations: During perception, the mind automatically categorizes physical events into broad types (e.g., occlusion and containment), which then guide attention to different properties (e.

Syntax and intentionality: an automatic link between language and theory-of-mind.

Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unintentionality bias).

The intentionality bias in schizophrenia.

The tendency to over-interpret events of daily life as resulting from voluntary or intentional actions is one of the key aspects of schizophrenia with persecutory delusions. Here, we ask whether this characteristic may emerge from the abnormal activity of a basic cognitive process found in healthy adults and children: the intentionality bias, which refers to the implicit and automatic inclination to interpret human actions as intentional (Rosset, 2008, Cognition 108, 771-780). In our experiment, patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls were shown sentences describing human actions in various linguistic contexts, and were asked to indicate whether the action was intentional or not.

Making sense of early false-belief understanding.

We address the puzzle about early belief ascription: young children fail elicited-response false-belief tasks, but they demonstrate spontaneous false-belief understanding. Based on recent converging evidence, we articulate a pragmatic framework to solve this puzzle. Young children do understand the contents of others' false belief, but they are overwhelmed when they must simultaneously make sense of two distinct actions: the instrumental action of a mistaken agent and the experimenter's communicative action.