Talking About Suffering in the Intensive Care Unit.

Background: Some have hypothesized that talk about suffering can be used by clinicians to motivate difficult decisions, especially to argue for reducing treatment at the end of life. We examined how talk about suffering is related to decision-making for critically ill patients, by evaluating transcripts of conversations between clinicians and patients' families.

Methods: We conducted a secondary qualitative content analysis of audio-recorded family meetings from a multicenter trial conducted in the adult intensive care units of five hospitals from 2012-2017 to look at how the term "suffering" and its variants were used.

Disability, Offense, and the Expressivist Objection to Medical Aid in Dying.

One criticism of medical aid in dying (MAID) is the expressivist objection: MAID is morally wrong because it expresses judgments about disabilities or persons with disabilities, that are offensive, disrespectful, or discriminatory. The expressivist objection can be made at the level of individual patients, medical providers, or the state. The expressivist objection originated with selective abortion, and responses to it in that context typically claim either that selective abortion does not express specific judgments about disabilities, or that any judgments expressed are not offensive.

Disruption of neural periodicity predicts clinical response after deep brain stimulation for obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Recent advances in surgical neuromodulation have enabled chronic and continuous intracranial monitoring during everyday life. We used this opportunity to identify neural predictors of clinical state in 12 individuals with treatment-resistant obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) receiving deep brain stimulation (DBS) therapy ( NCT05915741 ). We developed our neurobehavioral models based on continuous neural recordings in the region of the ventral striatum in an initial cohort of five patients and tested and validated them in a held-out cohort of seven additional patients.

Are Psychedelic Experiences Transformative? Can We Consent to Them?

Psychedelic substances have great promise for the treatment of many conditions, and they are the subject of intensive research. As with other medical treatments, both research and clinical use of psychedelics depend on our ability to ensure informed consent by patients and research participants. However, some have argued that informed consent for psychedelic use may be impossible, because psychedelic experiences can be transformative in the sense articulated by L.

Conceptual competence in psychiatric training: building a culture of conceptual inquiry.

Building a culture of conceptual inquiry in psychiatric training requires the development of conceptual competence: the ability to identify and examine assumptions that constitute the philosophical foundations of clinical care and scientific investigation in psychiatry. In this article, we argue for the importance of such competence and illustrate approaches to instilling it through examples drawn from our collective experiences as psychiatric educators.

Hard Choices: How Does Injustice Affect the Ethics of Medical Aid in Dying?

Critics of medical aid in dying (MAID) often argue that it is impermissible because background social conditions are insufficiently good for some persons who would utilize it. I provide a critical evaluation of this view. I suggest that receiving MAID is a sort of "hard choice," in that death is bad for the individual and only promotes that person's interests in special circumstances.

Does It Matter Whether a Psychiatric Intervention Is "Palliative"?

Palliative interventions are intended to alleviate suffering and improve quality, not quantity, of life and are not intended to cure illness. In psychiatry, uncertainty about which interventions count as palliative stems from the fact that psychiatry generally prioritizes symptom management irrespective of diagnosis or specific pathophysiology of illness. This commentary on a case considers how distinctions between palliative and other psychiatric interventions might not be all that helpful in resolving clinical and ethical questions about which interventions are-and when they are-appropriate.

Medical Assistance in Dying in Neurology.

An increasing number of jurisdictions have legalized medical assistance in dying (MAID) with significant variation in the procedures and eligibility criteria used. In the United States, MAID is available for persons with terminal illnesses but is frequently sought by persons with neurologic conditions. Persons with conditions that cause cognitive impairment, such as Alzheimer dementia, are often ineligible for MAID, as their illness is not considered terminal in its early stages, whereas in later stages, they may have impaired decision-making capacity.

What Do Psychiatrists Think About Caring for Patients Who Have Extremely Treatment-Refractory Illness?

Questions about when to limit unhelpful treatments are often raised in general medicine but are less commonly considered in psychiatry. Here we describe a survey of U.S.

A Focus Group Study of the Views of Persons with a History of Psychiatric Illness about Psychiatric Medical Aid in Dying.

Background: Medical aid in dying (MAID) is legal in a number of countries, including some states in the U.S. While MAID is only permitted for terminal illnesses in the U.

Suffering and the dilemmas of pediatric care: a response to Tyler Tate.

In a recent article, Tyler Tate argues that the suffering of children - especially children with severe cognitive impairments - should be regarded as the antithesis of flourishing, where flourishing is relative to one's individual characteristics and essentially involves receiving care from others. Although initially persuasive, Tate's theory is ambiguous in several ways, leading to significant conceptual problems. By identifying flourishing with receiving care, Tate raises questions about the importance of care that he does not address, giving rise to a bootstrapping problem.

Public mental health during and after the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic: Opportunities for intervention emotional self-efficacy and resilience.

Importance: During the pandemic, the number of United States adults reporting clinically significant symptoms of anxiety and depression sky-rocketed, up from 11% in 2020 to more than 40% in 2021. Our current mental healthcare system cannot adequately accommodate the current crisis; it is therefore important to identify opportunities for public mental health interventions.

Objective: Assess whether modifiable emotional factors may offer a point of intervention for the mental health crisis.

Epistemic injustice and the psychiatrist.

Background: Psychiatrists depend on their patients for clinical information and are obligated to regard them as trustworthy, except in special circumstances. Nevertheless, some critics of psychiatry have argued that psychiatrists frequently perpetrate against patients. Epistemic injustice is a moral wrong that involves unfairly discriminating against a person with respect to their ability to know things because of personal characteristics like gender or psychiatric diagnosis.

Moral Distress and Involuntary COVID-19 Vaccination of a Mature Minor Receiving Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment.

Mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 is a highly controversial issue, and many members of the public oppose it on the grounds that they should be free to determine what happens to their own body. Opinion has generally favored parental authority with respect to vaccination of children, but less attention has been paid to the ethical complexities of how to respond when mature minors refuse vaccination that is requested by their parents. We present a case in which an mature minor, who was psychiatrically hospitalized, refused vaccination that had been requested by her parents, which lead to significant moral distress for her caregivers.

Three kinds of suffering and their relative moral significance.

Suffering is widely assumed to have particular moral significance, and is of special relevance in medicine. There are, however, many theories about the nature of suffering that seem mutually incompatible. I suggest that there are three overall kinds of view about what suffering is: value-based theories, including the theory famously expounded by Eric Cassell, which as a group suggest that suffering is something like a state of distress related to threats to things that a person cares about; feeling-based theories, which equate suffering with aversive feelings or sensations like pain; and objective theories, which suggest that suffering is the absence of objective flourishing.

Ending One's Life in Advance.

If you developed Alzheimer disease, would you want to go all the way to the end of what might be a decade-long course? Some would; some wouldn't. Options open to those who choose to die sooner are often inadequate. Do-not-resuscitate orders and advance directives depend on others' cooperation.

Effects of temporary psychiatric holds on length of stay and readmission risk among persons admitted for psychotic disorders.

The practice of involuntary psychiatric commitment is central to the acute treatment of persons with severe mental illness and others in psychiatric crisis. Deciding whether a patient should be admitted involuntarily requires weighing respect for autonomy against beneficence, considering the clinical needs of the patient, and navigating ambiguous legal standards. The relative dearth of information about the impact of involuntary commitment on objective patient outcomes complicates matters ethically, legally, and clinically.