Perception of experience influences altruism and perception of agency influences trust in human-machine interactions.

As robots become increasingly integrated into social economic interactions, it becomes crucial to understand how people perceive a robot's mind. It has been argued that minds are perceived along two dimensions: experience, i.e.

Co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norm.

The co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norms has garnered significant attention, yet the underlying mechanisms remain elusive. Social norms result from empirical expectations, individual expectations of group behavior, and normative expectations, the population's expectations of individual behavior. Aligning these expectations aids in norm formation, but diverse individual reactions to observed behavior and their sensitivity to norm conformity can be challenging.

Perception, performance, and detectability of conversational artificial intelligence across 32 university courses.

The emergence of large language models has led to the development of powerful tools such as ChatGPT that can produce text indistinguishable from human-generated work. With the increasing accessibility of such technology, students across the globe may utilize it to help with their school work-a possibility that has sparked ample discussion on the integrity of student evaluation processes in the age of artificial intelligence (AI). To date, it is unclear how such tools perform compared to students on university-level courses across various disciplines.

Cooperation without punishment.

A fundamental question in social and biological sciences is whether self-governance is possible when individual and collective interests are in conflict. Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment. However, this solution is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible and when social interactions are noisy.

Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators.

It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not considered key behavior regularities observed in experimental and field settings, where the individuals behave like conditional cooperators who are more willing to donate and are also more willing to punish free riders.

Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games.

Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas.

Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators.

Conditional cooperation declines over time if heterogeneous ideal conditional agents are involved in repeated interactions. With strict assumptions of rationality and a population consisting of ideal conditional agents who strictly follow a decision rule, cooperation is not expected. However, cooperation is commonly observed in human societies.

Ambiguity in pictorial depth.

Pictorial space is the 3-D impression that one obtains when looking 'into' a 2-D picture. One is aware of 3-D 'opaque' objects. 'Pictorial reliefs' are the surfaces of such pictorial objects in 'pictorial space'.