Aggregated Power Indices for Measuring Indirect Control in Complex Corporate Networks with Float Shareholders.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce new methods to measure the indirect control power of firms in complex corporate shareholding structures using the concept of power indices from cooperative game theory. The proposed measures vary in desirable properties satisfied, as well as in the bargaining models of power indices used to construct them. Hence, they can be used to produce different pictures of the coalitional strength of firms in control of other firms in mutual shareholding networks with the presence of cycles.

Shapley-Based Estimation of Company Value-Concept, Algorithms and Parameters.

The aim of the article is to propose a new method of valuation of a company, considering its ownership relations with other companies. For this purpose, the concept of the Shapley value from cooperative game theory is used as the basis for assessing such dependent companies. The paper presents proposals for Shapley value calculation algorithms for our model.