Influential individuals can promote prosocial practices in heterogeneous societies: a mathematical and agent-based model.

In this paper, we examine how different governance types impact prosocial behaviors in a heterogenous society. We construct a general theoretical framework to examine a game-theoretic model to assess the ease of achieving a cooperative outcome. We then build a dynamic agent-based model to examine three distinct governance types in a heterogenous population: monitoring one's neighbors, despotic leadership, and influencing one's neighbors to adapt strategies that lead to better fitness.

Airborne disease transmission during indoor gatherings over multiple time scales: Modeling framework and policy implications.

Indoor superspreading events are significant drivers of transmission of respiratory diseases. In this work, we study the dynamics of airborne transmission in consecutive meetings of individuals in enclosed spaces. In contrast to the usual pairwise-interaction models of infection where effective contacts transmit the disease, we focus on group interactions where individuals with distinct health states meet simultaneously.

Localized prosocial preferences, public goods, and common-pool resources.

The presence of prosocial preferences is thought to reduce significantly the difficulty of solving societal collective action problems such as providing public goods (or reducing public bads). However, prosociality is often limited to members of an in-group. We present a general theoretical model where society is split into subgroups and people care more about the welfare of others in their own subgroup than they do about those in out-groups.

Environmental catastrophes and mitigation policies in a multiregion world.

In this paper we present a simple model for assessing the willingness to pay for reductions in the risk associated with catastrophic climate change. The model is extremely tractable and applies to a multiregion world but with global externalities and has five key features: () Neither the occurrence nor the costs of a catastrophic event in any one year are precisely predictable; () the probability of a catastrophe occurring in any one year increases as the levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere increase; () greenhouse gases are a worldwide public bad with emissions from any one country or region increasing the risks for all; () there is two-sided irreversibility; if nothing is done and the problem proves serious, the climate, economic activity, and human life will suffer permanent damage, but if we spend large sums on countermeasures and the problem turns out to be minor or even nonexistent, we will have wasted resources unnecessarily; and () technological progress may yield partial or even complete solutions. The framework that we propose can give a sense of the quantitative significance of mitigation strategies.

Political polarization.

Failures of government policies often provoke opposite reactions from citizens; some call for a reversal of the policy, whereas others favor its continuation in stronger form. We offer an explanation of such polarization, based on a natural bimodality of preferences in political and economic contexts and consistent with Bayesian rationality.