Action prediction modulates self-other integration in joint action.

People often coordinate actions with others, requiring an adjustable amount of self-other integration between actor's and co-actor's actions. Previous research suggests that such self-other integration (indexed by the joint Simon effect) is enhanced by agent similarity of the co-actor (e.g.

On the course of goal pursuit: The influence of goal progress on explicit judgments of self-agency.

The experience of causing our own actions and resulting outcomes (i.e., self-agency) is essential for the regulation of our actions during goal pursuit.

How vertical elevation affects self-other integration as measured by the joint Simon effect.

Earlier findings suggest that positions of power decrease self-other integration and increase psychological distance to others. Until now, however, evidence for this relation rests exclusively on subjective measures. The current research instead employed a vertical joint Simon task to measure self-other integration.

How to Form Good Habits? A Longitudinal Field Study on the Role of Self-Control in Habit Formation.

When striving for long-term goals (e.g., healthy eating, saving money, reducing energy consumption, or maintaining interpersonal relationships), people often get in conflict with their short-term goals (e.

Multisensory integration underlying body-ownership experiences in schizophrenia and offspring of patients: a study using the rubber hand illusion paradigm.

Background: Schizophrenia is a disorder of basic self-disturbance. Evidence suggests that people with schizophrenia may have aberrant experiences of body ownership: they may feel that they are not the subject of their own body experiences. However, little is known about the development of such disturbances.

A matter of you versus me? Experiences of control in a joint go/no-go task.

When interacting with others, people represent their own as well as their interaction partners' actions. Such joint action representation is essential for action coordination, but may also interfere with action control. We investigated how joint action representations affect experienced control over people's own actions and their interaction partners' actions.

Abnormal agency experiences in schizophrenia patients: Examining the role of psychotic symptoms and familial risk.

Experiencing self-agency over one's own action outcomes is essential for social functioning. Recent research revealed that patients with schizophrenia do not use implicitly available information about their action-outcomes (i.e.

Impaired frontal processing during agency inferences in schizophrenia.

People generally experience themselves as the cause of outcomes following from their own actions. Such agency inferences occur fluently and are essential to social interaction. However, schizophrenia patients often experience difficulties in distinguishing their own actions from those of others.

Individual differences in action co-representation: not personal distress or subclinical psychotic experiences but sex composition modulates joint action performance.

Successful social interaction requires the ability to integrate as well as distinguish own and others' actions. Normally, the integration and distinction of self and other are a well-balanced process, occurring without much effort or conscious attention. However, not everyone is blessed with the ability to balance self-other distinction and integration, resulting in personal distress in reaction to other people's emotions or even a loss of self [e.

Self-other integration and distinction in schizophrenia: A theoretical analysis and a review of the evidence.

Difficulties in self-other processing lie at the core of schizophrenia and pose a problem for patients' daily social functioning. In the present selective review, we provide a framework for understanding self-other integration and distinction, and impairments herein in schizophrenia. For this purpose, we discuss classic motor prediction models in relation to mirror neuron functioning, theory of mind, mimicry, self-awareness, and self-agency phenomena.

Abnormalities in the experience of self-agency in schizophrenia: A replication study.

People usually experience agency over their actions and subsequent outcomes. These agency inferences over action-outcomes are essential to social interaction, and occur when an actual outcome corresponds with either a specific goal (goal-based), and matches with action-outcome information that is subtly pre-activated in the situation at hand (prime-based). Recent research showed that schizophrenia patients exhibit goal-based inferences, but not prime-based inferences.

A matter of matching: how goals and primes affect self-agency experiences.

The sense of self-agency is a pervasive experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit outcome-priming process. Three experiments examined potential differences between these 2 processes.

Prime and probability: causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences.

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action-outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences.

When observing gaze shifts of others enhances object desirability.

The present research explored when observing gaze shifts of another person, involving both the observer and a specific object, enhances desirability of the gazed-at object. Specifically, we offer an initial attempt to test the idea that a three-step sequence consisting of direct gaze at the observer, followed by object-directed gaze and then by direct gaze at the observer, cues the desirability of an object to the observer and hence increases the perceived desirability of the gazed-at object. We examined this hypothesis in three experiments by manipulating eye-gaze shifts and including a no-gaze control condition.

Reflecting on the action or its outcome: behavior representation level modulates high level outcome priming effects on self-agency experiences.

Recent research suggests that one can have the feeling of being the cause of an action's outcome, even in the absence of a prior intention to act. That is, experienced self-agency over behavior increases when outcome representations are primed outside of awareness, prior to executing the action and observing the resulting outcome. Based on the notion that behavior can be represented at different levels, we propose that priming outcome representations is more likely to augment self-agency experiences when the primed representation corresponds with a person's behavior representation level.