Gamete Donor Consent and Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research.

There is a lack of consensus on whether the derivation and use of human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) from embryos remaining after infertility treatment morally require the informed consent of third-party gamete donors who contributed to the creation of the embryos. The principal guidelines for oversight and funding of hESC research in the United States make minimal or no demands for consent from gamete donors. In this article, I consider the arguments supporting and opposing gamete donor consent for hESC research and embryo research more broadly.

The role of animal models in evaluating reasonable safety and efficacy for human trials of cell-based interventions for neurologic conditions.

Progress in regenerative medicine seems likely to produce new treatments for neurologic conditions that use human cells as therapeutic agents; at least one trial for such an intervention is already under way. The development of cell-based interventions for neurologic conditions (CBI-NCs) will likely include preclinical studies using animals as models for humans with conditions of interest. This paper explores predictive validity challenges and the proper role for animal models in developing CBI-NCs.

Inequality, privacy, and mental health.

The state's mental health power is standardly understood in terms of the state's power to intervene with persons or populations to address mental health problems. This article advances a more expansive view of the state's mental health power, one which seeks to capture those exercises of state power that do not directly concern mental health but that nevertheless can have a profound effect on mental well-being. The article considers two features of contemporary American society that implicate the state in conditions that undermine, or threaten to undermine, mental health.

Morality and the limits of societal values in health care allocation.

In this paper, we consider whether there is a clear moral justification for the proposal that societal value preferences (SVPs) should be included in Cost Effectiveness Analyses (CEA) of health care resource allocations. We argue, first, that proponents of the use of SVPs need to be clear about the relationship between these values and moral principles. In particular, once moral principles are accepted as ruling out some SVPs (such as those that are irrational or revealing prejudice), an account is required of why we need to appeal to SVPs rather than moral principles to determine a just division of health care resources.