Potentiality switches and epistemic uncertainty: the Argument from Potential in times of human embryo-like structures.

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement-and perhaps ultimately replace-the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS-when further improved-also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP).

Modelling human embryogenesis: embryo-like structures spark ethical and policy debate.

Background: Studying the human peri-implantation period remains hindered by the limited accessibility of the in vivo environment and scarcity of research material. As such, continuing efforts have been directed towards developing embryo-like structures (ELS) from pluripotent stem cells (PSCs) that recapitulate aspects of embryogenesis in vitro. While the creation of such models offers immense potential for studying fundamental processes in both pre- and early post-implantation development, it also proves ethically contentious due to wide-ranging views on the moral and legal reverence due to human embryos.