A multi-agent decision-making framework for evaluating water and environmental resources management scenarios under climate change.

This paper introduces a hierarchical multi-agent decision-making framework for Water and Environmental Resources Management Scenarios (WERMSs) under uncertain conditions of climate change and complex agent characteristics. The proposed framework utilizes three Game Theory concepts: the Stackelberg, Bayesian (Incomplete), and Imperfect games, in order to incorporate the hierarchical structure of the agents and the temporal distribution and accuracy of information between them. The methodology is applied to the Zarrinehroud River Basin (ZRB), the largest hypersaline lake in the Middle East.

A regret-based behavioral model for shared water resources management: Application of the correlated equilibrium concept.

The competition over water use in shared water resources systems may lead to conflict. Conflict can lead to strategic behaviors with the consequence of "Tragedy of Common" in water resources. In this paper, a novel approach is proposed for the quantity and quality management of shared water resources using the Correlated Equilibrium (CE) concept.