Publications by authors named "Alexandra D Montague"

Objective: To examine the impact of "cross-market" hospital mergers on prices and quality and the extent to which serial acquisitions contribute to any measured effects.

Data Sources: 2009-2017 commercial claims from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) and quality measures from Hospital Compare.

Study Design: Event study models in which the treated group consisted of hospitals that acquired hospitals further than 50 miles, and the control group was hospitals that were not part of any merger activity (as a target or acquirer) during the study period.

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

The widespread consolidation of health systems, hospitals, and physicians has contributed to the high price of healthcare across the United States. While federal antitrust enforcers continue to play an important role in overseeing large mergers, acquisitions, and other consolidating transactions of major healthcare providers, state oversight over healthcare markets is essential to slow consolidation more broadly and address market failures across the country. State laws govern the scope of authority held by state attorneys general and other state agencies to receive notice of, review, and approve, conditionally approve, or block healthcare provider transactions, which can significantly impact the breadth and content of oversight.

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

Although hospital consolidation within markets has been well documented, consolidation across markets has not, even though economic theory predicts-and evidence is emerging-that cross-market hospital systems raise prices by exerting market power across markets when negotiating with common customers (primarily insurers). This study analyzes hospital systems using the American Hospital Association Annual Survey Database and defines hospital geographic markets as commuting zones that link workers to places of employment. The share of community hospitals in the US that were part of hospital systems increased from 10 percent in 1970 to 67 percent in 2019, resulting in 3,436 hospitals within 368 systems in 2019.

View Article and Find Full Text PDF

States can challenge proposed hospital mergers by using antitrust laws to prevent anticompetitive harms. This observational study examined additional state laws-principally charitable trust, nonprofit corporation, health and safety, and certificate-of-need laws-that can serve as complements and substitutes for antitrust laws by empowering states to be notified of, review, and challenge proposed hospital mergers through administrative processes. During the period 2010-19, 862 hospital mergers were proposed, but only forty-two (4.

View Article and Find Full Text PDF