The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics.

We explore the prospects of a monist account of explanation for both non-causal explanations in science and pure mathematics. Our starting point is the counterfactual theory of explanation (CTE) for explanations in science, as advocated in the recent literature on explanation. We argue that, despite the obvious differences between mathematical and scientific explanation, the CTE can be extended to cover both non-causal explanations in science and mathematical explanations.

When do non-epistemic values play an epistemically illegitimate role in science? How to solve one half of the new demarcation problem.

Solving the "new demarcation problem" requires a distinction between epistemically legitimate and illegitimate roles for non-epistemic values in science. This paper addresses one 'half' (i.e.

Getting rid of interventions.

According to James Woodward's influential interventionist account of causation, X is a cause of Y iff, roughly, there is a possible intervention on X that changes Y. Woodward requires that interventions be merely logically possible. I will argue for two claims against this modal character of interventions: First, merely logically possible interventions are dispensable for the semantic project of providing an account of the meaning of causal statements.