Why is Coerced Consent Worse Than No Consent and Deceived Consent?

The Standard View in research ethics maintains that, under certain conditions, investigators may deceive subjects and may enroll subjects without their consent. In contrast, it is always impermissible to coerce subjects to enroll, even when the same conditions are satisfied. This view raises a question that, as far as we are aware, has received no attention in the literature.

When and Why Is Research without Consent Permissible?

The purpose of consent is to let a person waive her rights of control over some aspects of her life. But becoming part of a research study does not always seriously undermine one's control.

The ethics of promulgating principles of research ethics: the problem of diversion effects.

There is an important distinction between ethical standards for the conduct of research with human subjects and the ethics of promulgating principles of research ethics. Those who promulgate ethical standards for the conduct of research have an ethical responsibility to consider the consequences to which those promulgations give rise. In particular, they must consider whether their promulgations will give researchers incentives not to conduct research or not to conduct research in locales in which participants would benefit from participation.

(Why) should we require consent to participation in research?

It is widely accepted that informed consent is a requirement of ethical biomedical research. It is less clear why this is so. As an argumentative strategy the article asks whether it would be legitimate for the state to require people to participate in research.

The social value requirement reconsidered.

It is widely assumed that it is ethical to conduct research with human subjects only if the research has social value. There are two standard arguments for this view. The allocation argument claims that public funds should not be devoted to research that lacks social value.

Non-completion and informed consent.

There is a good deal of biomedical research that does not produce scientifically useful data because it fails to recruit a sufficient number of subjects. This fact is typically not disclosed to prospective subjects. In general, the guidance about consent concerns the information required to make intelligent self-interested decisions and ignores some of the information required for intelligent altruistic decisions.

Voluntary consent: why a value-neutral concept won't work.

Some maintain that voluntariness is a value-neutral concept. On that view, someone acts involuntarily if subject to a controlling influence or has no acceptable alternatives. I argue that a value-neutral conception of voluntariness cannot explain when and why consent is invalid and that we need a moralized account of voluntariness.

Misconceptions about coercion and undue influence: reflections on the views of IRB members.

Payment to recruit research subjects is a common practice but raises ethical concerns relating to the potential for coercion or undue influence. We conducted the first national study of IRB members and human subjects protection professionals to explore attitudes as to whether and why payment of research participants constitutes coercion or undue influence. Upon critical evaluation of the cogency of ethical concerns regarding payment, as reflected in our survey results, we found expansive or inconsistent views about coercion and undue influence that may interfere with valuable research.

The fair transaction model of informed consent: an alternative to autonomous authorization.

The doctrine of informed consent in bioethics has relied on the view that consent is valid when it represents a patient or research subject's autonomous authorization. In this article we challenge this reigning conception of the validity of informed consent in clinical research, focusing in particular on the problem of the therapeutic misconception. We argue that the autonomous authorization model of informed consent suffers from four defects: (1) it fails to do justice to the relevance of risk-benefit considerations in shaping the criteria for the validity of consent, (2) it compromises the interests of subjects by preventing them from consenting to research participation with less than substantial understanding when doing so would likely be consistent with their preferences and beneficial to them or at least be unlikely to cause them harm, (3) it jeopardizes the interests of investigators by denying them fair notice regarding when the consent of research subjects can be considered valid and thus make it permissible for them to be enrolled in research, and (4) it threatens the reasonable limits on the responsibility of investigators to assure the adequacy of subjects' understanding of what research participation involves.

Is payment a benefit?

What I call 'the standard view' claims that IRBs should not regard financial payment as a benefit to subjects for the purpose of risk/benefit assessment. Although the standard view is universally accepted, there is little defense of that view in the canonical documents of research ethics or the scholarly literature. This paper claims that insofar as IRBs should be concerned with the interests and autonomy of research subjects, they should reject the standard view and adopt 'the incorporation view.

The right to withdraw from research.

The right to withdraw from participation in research is recognized in virtually all national and international guidelines for research on human subjects. It is therefore surprising that there has been little justification for that right in the literature. We argue that the right to withdraw should protect research participants from information imbalance, inability to hedge, inherent uncertainty, and untoward bodily invasion, and it serves to bolster public trust in the research enterprise.

The obligation to participate in biomedical research.

The current prevailing view is that participation in biomedical research is above and beyond the call of duty. While some commentators have offered reasons against this, we propose a novel public goods argument for an obligation to participate in biomedical research. Biomedical knowledge is a public good, available to any individual even if that individual does not contribute to it.

Principles for allocation of scarce medical interventions.

Allocation of very scarce medical interventions such as organs and vaccines is a persistent ethical challenge. We evaluate eight simple allocation principles that can be classified into four categories: treating people equally, favouring the worst-off, maximising total benefits, and promoting and rewarding social usefulness. No single principle is sufficient to incorporate all morally relevant considerations and therefore individual principles must be combined into multiprinciple allocation systems.

Facing up to paternalism in research ethics.

Bioethicists have failed to understand the pervasively paternalistic character of research ethics. Not only is the overall structure of research review and regulation paternalistic in some sense; even the way informed consent is sought may imply paternalism. Paternalism has limits, however.

Two questions about surrogacy and exploitation.

In this article I will consider two related questions about surrogacy and exploitation: (1) Is surrogacy exploitative? (2) If surrogacy is exploitative, what is the moral force of this exploitation? Briefly stated, I shall argue that whether surrogacy is exploitative depends on whether exploitation must be harmful to the exploited party or whether (as I think) there can be mutually advantageous exploitation. It also depends on some facts about surrogacy about which we have little reliable evidence and on our philosophical view on what counts as a harm to the surrogate. Our answer to the second question will turn in part on the account of exploitation we invoke in answering the first question and in part on the way in which we resolve some other questions about the justification of state interference.