Evolutionary game of international trade network based on trade policy differences.

Trade policy differences among different countries are important factors affecting international trade cooperation. In this paper, we build an evolutionary game model of international trade in which complex networks portray game relationships and trade policy differences are game strategies of players. Compared with the fully coupled game relationship and two-strategies game, the game relationship dynamic adjustment, trade policy differences and stochastic game payoffs in this paper are more in line with the real international trade context.

The evolutionary extortion game of multiple groups in hypernetworks.

As a type of zero-determinant strategies, the extortion strategy was found to be an evolutionarily stable strategy in structural groups. However, instead of complex networks structure, this paper focus on a multi-group game in hypernetworks, using the framework of a gift giving game driven by replicator-like dynamics. We find that the extortion is evolutionarily stable in the hypernetwork structure.

Asymptotically local synchronization in interdependent networks with unidirectional interlinks.

Synchronization in complex networks has been investigated for decades. Due to the particularity of the interlinks between networks, the synchronization in interdependent networks has received increasing interest. Since the interlinks are not always symmetric in interdependent networks, we focus on the synchronization in unidirectional interdependent networks to study the control scheme.

The Evolution of Hyperedge Cardinalities and Bose-Einstein Condensation in Hypernetworks.

To depict the complex relationship among nodes and the evolving process of a complex system, a Bose-Einstein hypernetwork is proposed in this paper. Based on two basic evolutionary mechanisms, growth and preference jumping, the distribution of hyperedge cardinalities is studied. The Poisson process theory is used to describe the arrival process of new node batches.