Why cultural distance can promote - or impede - group-beneficial outcomes.

Quantifying the distance between cultural groups has received substantial recent interest. A key innovation, borrowed from population genetics, is the calculation of cultural () statistics on datasets of human culture. Measuring the variance between groups as a fraction of total variance, is theoretically important in additive models of cooperation.

Selection and adaptation in human migration.

This article reviews the ways migration shapes human biology. This includes the physiological and genetic, but also socio-cultural aspects such as organization, behavior, and culture. Across disciplines I highlight the multiple levels of cultural and genetic selection whereby individuals and groups adapt to pressures along a migration timeline: the origin, transit, and destination.

Ethnic Markers and How to Find Them : An Ethnographic Investigation of Marker Presence, Recognition, and Social Information.

Ethnic markers are a prominent organizing feature of human society when individuals engage in significant anonymous interactions. However, identifying markers in natural settings is nontrivial. Although ad hoc assignment of markers to groups is widely documented in the ethnographic literature, predicting the membership of individuals based on stylistic variation is less clear.

A measure of social coordination and group signaling in the wild.

Adaptive interactions in large populations often require honest signals of group membership to structure interactions. However, limitations to a simple mapping of groups onto stylistic and ethnosomatic variation suggest that new ways of measurement are needed to describe the work that objects do to facilitate social coordination. Means to measure the benefits to coordinating on specific objects, here called signaling value, would transition inquiry from general statement that signals play a role, to which signals play what roles in what contexts.

Cooperative Learning Groups and the Evolution of Human Adaptability : (Another Reason) Why Hermits Are Rare in Tonga and Elsewhere.

Understanding the prevalence of adaptive culture in part requires understanding the dynamics of learning. Here we explore the adaptive value of social learning in groups and how formal social groups function as effective mediums of information exchange. We discuss the education literature on Cooperative Learning Groups (CLGs), which outlines the potential of group learning for enhancing learning outcomes.

The population ecology of despotism. Concessions and migration between central and peripheral habitats.

Since despotism is a common evolutionary development in human history, we seek to understand the conditions under which it can originate, persist, and affect population trajectories. We describe a general system of population ecology equations representing the Ideal Free and Despotic Distributions for one and two habitats, one of which contains a despotic class that controls the distribution of resources. Using analytical and numerical solutions we derive the optimal concession strategy by despots with and without subordinate migration to an alternative habitat.

Who was helping? The scope for female cooperative breeding in early Homo.

Derived aspects of our human life history, such as short interbirth intervals and altricial newborns, have been attributed to male provisioning of nutrient-rich meat within monogamous relationships. However, many primatologists and anthropologists have questioned the relative importance of pair-bonding and biparental care, pointing to evidence that cooperative breeding better characterizes human reproductive and child-care relationships. We present a mathematical model with empirically-informed parameter ranges showing that natural selection favors cooperation among mothers over a wide range of conditions.

Evolutionary thinking in microeconomic models: prestige bias and market bubbles.

Evolutionary models broadly support a number of social learning strategies likely important in economic behavior. Using a simple model of price dynamics, I show how prestige bias, or copying of famed (and likely successful) individuals, influences price equilibria and investor disposition in a way that exacerbates or creates market bubbles. I discuss how integrating the social learning and demographic forces important in cultural evolution with economic models provides a fruitful line of inquiry into real-world behavior.