Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: Are They Nonconscious, Unconscious, or Subconscious? Expanding the Discussion.

Unprecedented advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) have given rise to ethical questions about how to recognize and respect autonomy and a sense of agency of the personhood when those capacities are themselves disordered, as they typically are in patients with DoC. At the intersection of these questions rests the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness. Indeed, evaluations of consciousness levels and capacity for recovery have a significant impact on decisions regarding whether to discontinue or prolong life-sustaining therapy for DoC patients.

Turning Back the Clock: A Retrospective Single-Blind Study on Brain Age Change in Response to Nutraceuticals Supplementation vs. Lifestyle Modifications.

Background: There is a growing consensus that chronological age (CA) is not an accurate indicator of the aging process and that biological age (BA) instead is a better measure of an individual's risk of age-related outcomes and a more accurate predictor of mortality than actual CA. In this context, BA measures the "true" age, which is an integrated result of an individual's level of damage accumulation across all levels of biological organization, along with preserved resources. The BA is plastic and depends upon epigenetics.

Contemplating on the Nature of Selfhood in DoC Patients: Neurophenomenological Perspective.

Medical well-regarded policy recommendations for patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) are almost exclusively relied on behavioural examination and evaluation of higher-order cognition, and largely disregard the patients' self. This is so because practically establishing the presence of self-awareness or Selfhood is even more challenging than evaluating the presence of consciousness. At the same time, establishing the potential (actual physical possibility) of Selfhood in DoC patients is crucialy important from clinical, ethical, and moral standpoints because Selfhood is the most central and private evidence of being an independent and free agent that unites intention, embodiment, executive functions, attention, general intelligence, emotions and other components within the intra-subjective frame (first-person givenness).

Self, Me and I in the repertoire of spontaneously occurring altered states of Selfhood: eight neurophenomenological case study reports.

This study investigates eight case reports of spontaneously emerging, brief episodes of vivid altered states of Selfhood (ASoSs) that occurred during mental exercise in six long-term meditators by using a neurophenomenological electroencephalography (EEG) approach. In agreement with the neurophenomenological methodology, first-person reports were used to identify such spontaneous ASoSs and to guide the neural analysis, which involved the estimation of three operational modules of the brain self-referential network (measured by EEG operational synchrony). The result of such analysis demonstrated that the documented ASoSs had unique neurophenomenological profiles, where several aspects or components of Selfhood (measured neurophysiologically and phenomenologically) are affected and expressed differently, but still in agreement with the neurophysiological three-dimensional construct model of the complex experiential Selfhood proposed in our earlier work (Fingelkurts et al.

Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again.

Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Kallio-Tamminen, 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this relation is yet to be shown.